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Accident prevention and system safety are important considerations for many 
industries, especially large-scale hazardous ones such as the nuclear, the chemical, and 
the aerospace industries. Limitations in the current tools and approaches to risk 
assessment and accident prevention are broadly recognized in the risk research 
community. Furthermore, as new technologies and systems are developed, new failure 
modes can emerge and new patterns by which accidents unfold. A safety gap is growing 
between the software-intensive technological capabilities of present systems and the still 
“too much hardware oriented” current approaches for handling risk assessment and safety 
issues.  
To overcome these limitations, a novel framework and analytical tools for model-
based system safety, or safety supervisory control, is developed to guide safety 
interventions and support a dynamic approach to risk assessment and accident prevention. 
This integrated approach rests on two basic pillars: (i) the use of state-space models and 
state variables (from Control Theory) to capture the dynamics of hazard escalation, and to 
both model and monitor “danger indices” in a system; and (ii) the adoption of Temporal 
Logic (TL, from Software Engineering) to model and verify system safety properties (or 
their violations, hence identify vulnerabilities in a system). The verification of whether 
the system satisfies or violates the TL safety properties along with the monitoring of 
emerging hazards provide important feedback for designers and operators to recognize 
the need for, rank, and trigger safety interventions. In so doing, the proposed approach 
augments the current perspective of traditional risk assessment with its reliance on 
 xvi 
probabilities as the basic modeling ingredient with the notion of temporal contingency, a 
novel dimension here proposed by which hazards are dynamically prioritized and ranked 
based on the temporal vicinity of their associated accident(s) to being released. 
Additionally, the online application of the proposed tools and the ensuing insights can 
support situational awareness and help inform decision-making during emerging 
hazardous situations.  
The integrated framework is implemented in Simulink and is capable of 
combining hardware, software, and operators’ control actions and responses within a 
single analysis tool, as examined through its detailed application to runway overrun 
scenarios during rejected takeoffs (RTO). New insights are enabled by the use of 
temporal logic in conjunction with model-based system safety. For example, new metrics 
and diagnostic tools to support pilots’ go/no-go decisions and to inform safety guidelines 
are derived. Limitations exists in the current recommended practice that advises pilots to 
initiate RTOs only before the decision speed V1 is reached, as suggested by current 
statistics regarding RTOs accidents and as recognized by aircraft manufacturers. The new 
proposed metrics are capable of accounting for both situations in which RTOs are 
initiated below the traditional decision speed V1 and still result in an accident, and 
situations for which RTOs are initiated above V1 that do not. Moreover, within the 
context of a detailed case study, a new TL safety constraint is proposed to overcome an 
identified latent error in the logic of the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) 
at takeoff, which in this case escalated a hazardous condition into a fatal crash. In short, 
by leveraging tools that are not traditionally employed in risk assessment, the framework 
and tools proposed offer novel capabilities, complementary to the traditional approaches 
 xvii 
for risk assessment, and rich possibilities for informing safety interventions (by design 











 Accident prevention and system safety are important considerations for many 
industries, especially large scale hazardous ones such as the nuclear, the chemical, and 
the airline industries. Broadly speaking, system safety refers to the state of sustainably 
ensuring accident prevention through coordinated actions, strategic and tactical, on 
multiple safety levers, technical, organizational, or regulatory.  
 The interest in accident causation and system safety is self-evident, but it is 
worth articulating in order to provide a general background and motivation for the 
present work. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 introduces the motivations and 
the objectives of this work. Section 1.2 presents a high-level overview of the novel 
framework and analytical tools proposed in the thesis. Section 1.3 provides the 
presentation plan of the thesis. 
1.1 Motivations and Objectives 
 High-visibility accidents such as the crash of the Air France flight 447, the 
capsizing of the Costa Concordia, the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, 
or tragedies like the Bhopal and the Chernobyl disasters are often invoked to motivate 
an interest in accident prevention and system safety (Figure 1.1). Such accidents have a 
high impact on the media as they generally result in dramatic casualty tolls, significant 
financial losses, and environmental damages (Table 1.1). Unfortunately, industrial 
accidents, also known under the broader designation of organizational or system 
accidents, happen much more frequently than what may be conveyed by the “high-
visibility” above-the-media-radar-screen accidents [Singer and Endreny, 1993]. 
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Examples of such accidents abound in many industries, such as the chemical, oil and 
gas, mining, and transportation industries to name a few.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Costa Concordia capsizing, the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, the crash of 
the Air France flight 447 (credits: depositphotos.org) 
 
Table 1.1 Financial losses and casualties for the accidents of Figure 1.1 (source: www.reuters.com) 
Accident Financial Loss Casualties 
Costa Concordia > 600 $M 31 
Air France 447 > 300 $M 228 
Deepwater Horizon > 4 $B 11 
 
 When carefully analyzed, many system accidents share a conceptual sameness 
in the way they occur, through a combination of system design and technical flaws, 
operational or workforce failings, compromised organizational behaviors and 
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management shortcomings, and/or deficient regulatory oversight [Saleh et al., 2010]. 
This observation of a conceptual sameness in the way system accidents occur along 
with the propensity for this class of adverse events suggests that some limitations may 
exist in the current way of thinking about and handling of these issues, and are 
indicative of theoretical deficiencies in the understanding of system accident causation 
and prevention. 
 Such limitations and deficiencies are becoming more evident with the increasing 
reliance on software-intensive systems in our daily lives and for process control. As 
new technologies and systems are developed, new failure modes emerge and new 
patterns by which accidents unfold. It is important to adopt a proactive safety attitude in 
understanding what these new failure modes might be and pre-empt them. A safety gap 
is growing between the software-intensive technological capabilities of present systems 
and our understanding of the ways they can fail, thus hindering the ability to prevent 
accidents. Other authors [Zio 2014; Mosleh, 2014] have expressed concerns regarding 
the “too much hardware oriented” approaches of the traditional tools of Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA), and advocated new and improved approaches to system safety 
and accident prevention in these regards.  
 Following to the increasing spread of cyber-physical systems, where 
interactions between technologically-advanced hardware, software, and human 
operators are necessary, there is a demand for novel approaches that can combine all 
these aspects within the same analytical framework. Moreover, while different 
analytical tools are available for risk analysis (many of which are included under the 
heading of PRA or variations on it), formal frameworks and analytical approaches also 
able to tackle system safety issues are conspicuously missing from the safety literature. 
 System safety and risk analysis, while complementary to each other, differ in 
one important way. Risk analysis, at its core, is the imagination of failure. Whether in a 
safety or security context – depending on the absence/presence of active volition – risk 
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analysis is anticipatory rationality examining the possibility of adverse events and 
failure mechanisms. The tools of risk analysis support this imaginative effort; they help 
identify and prioritize risks, inform risk management, and support risk communication. 
They do not provide however design or operational guidelines and principles for 
eliminating or mitigating the identified risks. The tools subsumed under risk analysis 
can help assess the effectiveness of measures taken to address various risks, but they 
offer no support in identifying or conceiving what these measures ought to be. Such 
considerations fall instead within the purview of system safety. 
 In this work it is proposed that the application of formal analytical tools to 
system safety issues as well as to traditional risk assessment procedures can not only 
work towards the identification and prioritization of emerging hazards in a system, but 
also towards guiding safety interventions on the system in both on-line and off-line 
contexts.  
 At a macro level, this work addresses the limitations previously highlighted by 
setting forward three main objectives: 
1. The exploration of novel approaches and analytical tools to bear on risk 
assessment and system safety issues, inspired by important technical disciplines 
that still struggle to make a stand in the risk/safety community, such as of 
Control Theory and Computer Science/Software Engineering; 
2. The development of an integrated framework able to handle hardware, software, 
and the effects of operators’ control actions and responses to emerging hazards 
within the same analysis;  
3. The development of an integrated framework that leverages formal approaches 
and novel techniques for both the identification/ranking/prioritization of 
interventions for emerging hazards (risk assessment purview), and the support 
and guidance for better informed decision-making regarding both on-line and 
off-line safety interventions (system safety purview). 
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 The introduction of new concepts and complementary perspectives beyond the 
current probability-based toolset of risk analysis provides a useful addition for many 
safety practitioners. Additionally, the set up of novel bases, formulated at a high-level 
of abstraction, for system safety and accident causation deserve a careful attention, 
given their potential for “export” and broad application and adaptation to several 
different engineering domains.   
1.2 A Novel Framework for Dynamic Risk-Informed Safety Intervention 
 In order to accomplish the objectives set forth for this work, a novel framework 
and formal tools for model-based system safety, which I also term safety supervisory 
control framework1, is developed and presented in the thesis.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Overview of the proposed framework 
                                                
 
 







































































 The proposed approach has two fundamental ingredients: (1) the use of state-
space models and state variables (from Control Theory) to capture the dynamics of 
hazard escalation, and to both model and monitor “danger indices” in a system; and (2) 
the adoption of Temporal Logic (from Computer Science and Software Engineering) to 
model and verify system safety properties (or their violations, hence identify 
vulnerabilities in a system). The integrated framework is shown in Figure 1.2 and its 
ingredients are analyzed in detail in chapters 3 and 4. 
 The framework and analytical tools here developed are grounded in Control 
Theory and make use of the state-space representation in modeling dynamical systems. 
The use of state variables allows the definition of metrics for accident escalation, 
termed hazard levels or danger indices (used interchangeably hereafter), which measure 
the “proximity” of the system to adverse events. Furthermore, the adoption of state-
space formalism, as will be shown in detail in chapter 3, allows the estimation of the 
times at which critical thresholds for the hazard level are (b)reached. This estimation 
process provides important prognostic information and produces a proxy for a time-to-
accident metric or advance notice for an impending adverse event. The hazard levels 
and the time-to-accident metrics create a portfolio of hazard coordinates that can then 
be displayed dynamically in a “hazard temporal contingency map” to support operators’ 
situational awareness and help them prioritize attention and defensive resources for 
accident prevention. The idea and capability of measuring the proximity to a 
performance goal is essential for proper control of a system—this is a fundamental 
concept in Control Theory. By extension, the ability to measure the proximity of a 
system to adverse events, proximity in the form of hazard levels or danger indices, is 
crucial for accident prevention and sustainment of system safety. It also makes for 
improved dynamic risk assessment and management.  
 The monitoring of hazard levels and the estimation of the time window 
available for safety interventions provide important feedback for various stakeholders 
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and decision-makers to guide safety interventions both on-line (towards accident 
prevention and/or mitigation) and off-line (towards re-design and re-engineering of 
safer systems).  
 These capabilities are furthermore extended by the adoption of Temporal Logic 
(TL) in support of the hazard level monitoring effort. The use of TL in risk assessment 
and safety issues offers many possibilities for overcoming some of the limitations 
associated with traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), for example in 
accounting for time-related considerations in accident scenarios and in handling 
software issues (details are presented in Chapter 2). Temporal Logic is here employed 
(among other things) for the specification of safety properties that act as constraint on 
the system behavior. The verification of whether the system satisfies a given property 
or not provides an important feedback in regards to missing/inadequate safety features 
embedded in the system and has a fundamental role for informing system design in the 
early development stages. 
 The integrated approach of Figure 1.2 augments the current perspective in 
traditional risk assessment and its reliance on probabilities as the fundamental modeling 
ingredient with the notion of temporal contingency, a novel dimension here proposed 
by which hazards are dynamically prioritized and ranked based on the temporal vicinity 
of their associated accident(s) to being released. It is hoped that this work helps to 
expand the basis of risk assessment beyond its reliance on probabilistic tools, and that it 
serves to enrich the intellectual toolkit of risk researchers and safety professionals. 
1.3 Presentation Plan 
 The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following way.  
 Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the state-of-the-art for risk assessment, 
and details the limitations mentioned in Section 1.1 together with the workarounds 
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proposed by the risk and safety community. Those serve both as motivation and as basis 
for the work presented here.  
 The following Chapters 3, 4, and 5 constitute the core of the thesis and tackle in 
detail the development of the framework of Figure 1.2. Specifically: Chapter 3 presents 
the first ingredient, i.e., the model-based hazard monitoring process enabled by the 
state-space formalism and the prognostic dimension of temporal contingency for 
prioritizing safety interventions; Chapter 4 presents the second ingredient, i.e., the use 
of TL for the expression of safety properties that act as constraints on the system 
behavior and in support of the hazard monitoring process.  
 These two ingredients should not be considered in isolation. In fact each of them 
informs the other, and their integration is tackled in Chapter 5, which also provides a 
detailed application used as “proof-of-concept” for the proposed framework. Figure 1.3 
provides a schematic representation of how these three “core chapters” fit together.   
 
 
Figure 1.3 Schematic representation of “core chapters” structure 
 Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this work with a summary of the contributions and 













LITERATURE REVIEW AND STATE-OF-THE-ART 
 
 This chapter presents an organized overview of the historical development and 
the state-of-the-art techniques for risk assessment. The seminal works that have shaped 
the thinking about risk in hazardous industries are presented in Section 2.1. Among 
those, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) stands out as the first analytical and 
quantitative approach, which is nowadays widely adopted in industry. Section 2.2 thus 
tackles the presentation of this important approach together with the challenges and 
limitations that continue to occupy researchers. The workarounds and novel approaches 
that were born in response to such shortcomings are presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  
2.1 Seminal Works and Historical Development  
 Different academics and professionals communities have grappled with the 
multi-disciplinary issues of system safety and accident causation, including 
psychologists, sociologists, engineers, and management/organizational scientists. The 
literature on accident causation and system safety is extensive but fragmented, and it is 
strongly intertwined with the concepts and tools of risk analysis on the one hand, and 
accident models on the other hand. 
 Four seminal works shape the current thinking about accident causation and 
system safety, as well as the analytical handling of risk analysis [Saleh et al., 2010]: 
 
• Turner’s Man-Made Disasters [Turner 1978]: this work is one of the first 
scholarly accounts of industrial accidents not as fatalistic “sudden Acts of  
God” but as events that can be carefully analyzed. Turner’s three seminal 
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contributions were: (1) man-made disasters are a particular class of events that 
have common patterns in their making, and they can be analyzed to improve 
future systems’ safety; (2) accidents are in the making over long incubation 
periods, their causes extend deep into the past as a “chain of discrepant events 
[often] develop and accumulate unnoticed” until an accident is released; and (3) 
most importantly, accidents cannot be ascribed to purely technical problems, 
and management and organizational matters are key contributors to accidents. 
While the specifics of Turner’s work may be in part obsolete today, its key 
theoretical insights have an enduring value and provide much of the conceptual 
foundations for an extensive literature that followed in its wake on accident 
causation and system safety. 
• Perrow’s Normal Accidents [Perrow, 1984]: the premise of this work is that in 
some systems characterized by “interactive complexity and tight coupling” 
among its components, accidents cannot be foreseen or prevented; they are 
“normal” and unavoidable. For example, Perrow’s study of the Three Mile 
Island accident led him to consider it “unexpected, incomprehensible, 
uncontrollable and unavoidable; such accidents had occurred before in nuclear 
plants, and would occur again, regardless of how well they were run.” Hopkins 
[2001] described this pessimistic conclusion as “an unashamedly technological 
determinism.” Perrow’s work remains influential to date. Despite its 
importance, Normal Accident has been criticized for its oversimplification or 
lack of understanding of technical and operational choices (Perrow being a 
sociologist). Normal Accident has a distinct sociological focus. One 
fundamental objection to Normal Accident is that it does not help make better 
risk-informed design or operational choices; it only advances the argument that 
in some systems, accidents are inevitable. 
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• The work on High Reliability Organizations (HRO) [Roberts, 1990a,b]: this 
collective work, originally started by Karlene Roberts at Berkeley, empirically 
examines what successful organizations do – how they organize and manage 
hazardous systems and processes – to promote and ensure system safety. This is 
a different (and, in a sense, opposite) mindset from what has been described as 
Perrow’s pessimistic contribution to the safety community. HRO studies 
analyzed operations of US aircraft carriers, air traffic control, electric power 
distributions, and firefighting. These “organizations” constituted the initial basis 
of what came to be called High Reliability Organizations, and their practices 
became the benchmarks and best practices for handling risk and supporting 
safety in hazardous industries [Saleh et al., 2010]. While some objections exist 
on the definition of what a “high reliability” organization is, the contributions of 
this work should not be underestimated, as important advancements were made 
in identifying managerial and organizational issues affecting system safety. 
• Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [Rasmussen, 1975]: The ideas and 
contributions to accident causation and system safety discussed previously 
lacked an analytical dimension and connections with the technicalities of the 
system under consideration, its configuration and operational characteristics. 
These were provided by the development of Probabilistic Risk Assessment. In a 
parallel track to the history of ideas pertaining to accidents and system safety 
discussed previously, a major study was published in 1975 in which the formal 
PRA technique was introduced and applied to nuclear reactors. The study 
developed a framework and a set of analytical tools under the broad heading of 
PRA for assessing accident scenarios and risks in complex systems. PRA is an 
event-driven framework and technique; it is based on the idea of a stochastic 
chain of events leading to an accident and starting with an undesirable initiating 
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event then progressing through various “risk scenarios” until the negative final 
outcome is reached. Most of the qualitative and quantitative tools that are well-
established and used nowadays gained success from the preliminary work on 
PRA, so that in many occasions the PRA approach has become a synonym of 
the entire risk analysis field. These tools include the use of risk matrices, failure 
modes and effects analysis (FMEA) tables, event trees (ET) and fault trees (FT) 
analysis, and reliability block diagrams (RBD) to mention a few. Given the 
predominance of PRA in the current toolkit of safety practitioners and its 
traditional importance, some of the capabilities of the framework here presented 
are compared and considered as a complementary perspective to this approach. 
  
 
Figure 2.1 Evolution in the development of system safety approaches. Adapted from [Saleh et al., 2010] 
  
 The evolution of ideas and approaches in the past fifty years has revolved 
around three major tracks, highlighted in Figure 2.1. In addition to the seminal works 
previously mentioned, Figure 2.1 shows in a separate track the basis for risk-informed 
decisions originally conceptualized by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
namely defense-in-depth. In its bare essence, defense-in-depth consists in the design 
and implementation of multiple safety barriers, technical, procedural, and 
organizational, and whose objective is first to prevent accident initiating events from 
occurring, second to block accident sequences from escalating, and third to mitigate 
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adverse consequences should the previous barriers fail. Accidents typically result from 
the absence, inadequacy, or breach of such defenses [Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung & 
Rasmussen, 2002]. 
 Recent contributions are emerging as foundational for the thinking about system 
safety and accident causation in the framework of System and Control Theory, 
including the works by Reason [1997], Hollnagel [2004], Rasmussen [1997], and the 
distinct contributions by Leveson [1995] and [2004]. 
 The control perspective on system safety mirrors the fact that accidents typically 
result from the absence or breach of defenses, technical and organizational safety 
barriers, or in this case from a violation of safety constraints [Leveson, 2004]. 
Conversely, system safety in this perspective is conceived to result from the 
establishment of safety barriers and enforcement of safety constraints (again of 
technical and organizational nature). Within this perspective, Leveson proposed the 
following three major “control factors” in accident causation: (1) inadequate 
enforcement of safety constraints, (2) inadequate execution of control actions, and (3) 
inadequate feedback. The explicit articulation of the control perspective identifies 
decision-makers as the “controllers” and discusses the attributes of controllers for 
properly handling of hazardous processes, including their competence, or “formal 
knowledge, heuristic, and practical skills […] to determine whether [they] can make the 
appropriate risk management decisions [for] a coherent safety control function” as well 
as their incentives and commitment to safety [Rasmussen, 1997]. Rasmussen’s work, 
although informal in his treatment of a broad range of safety-related topics, remains 
highly influential to date and appears to be the intellectual foundation on which 
Leveson [2004] expanded and built the “Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes” or STAMP model for accident causation and system safety. Leveson 
emphasizes safety constraints, rather than events, as the most basic concept in accident 
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analysis, and she highlights ways in which inadequate control of these constraints lead 
to their violation and subsequently to accidents. 
 The work carried out for this thesis falls under the last heading in Figure 2.1, 
namely “Controls and systems theoretic approaches to safety.” It follows in the same 
spirit as some of the works mentioned previously, especially those by Rasmussen and 
Leveson. It expands on these works in some ways and departs from them in others, 
particularly in its clear departure from the analysis tools of PRA (e.g., fault trees) and in 
the adoption of tools from the actual discipline of Control Theory and of concepts 
derived from Computer Science.   
2.2 PRA as State-of-the-Art: Current Challenges and Limitations  
 As previously mentioned, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a staple in the 
engineering risk community, and it has become to some extent synonymous with the 
entire quantitative risk assessment undertaking2. Since the 1970s PRA has gained 
popularity and it is widely adopted beyond the nuclear industry context, in many 
hazardous industries like the chemical, the oil and gas, and the aerospace ones. 
2.2.1 The PRA Workflow  
 PRA tackles three important questions related to the entire risk analysis field, 
namely [Apostolakis, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981]:  
 
1) What can go wrong? 
2) How likely is it? 
                                                
 
 
2 Given its importance and its widespread use in industry, the framework presented in this work is 
compared in its capabilities and limitations to the more traditional approaches of PRA. A dedicated 
Appendix is provided to show a direct comparison of benefits and limitations of the proposed approach 
with more traditional tools. This comparison is presented in the form of a summarizing table, which lists 
important capabilities associated to risk assessment.  
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3) What would be the consequences? 
  
 Traditional (or static) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is aimed at providing 
an answer to these three questions roughly by means of the following workflow 
(adapted from [Apostolakis, 2004]): 
 
• First, possible risks are identified through any hazard evaluation procedure 
(generally in the form of a structured brainstorming effort based on the system 
design and on past experience with similar plants). Risk analysis is at its core 
the imagination of failure [Saleh et al., 2014b], and this first step provides the 
analyst with a set of undesirable end states (the consequences of the third 
question) that are then traced back to the initiating events that bring the system 
from its nominal state of operations to off-nominal states. 
• Secondly, Event Trees and Fault Trees are employed to generate accident 
scenarios. These two techniques, which employ standard logic (inductive and 
deductive logics with the use of the Boolean operators AND “∧” and OR 
“∨”), identify the sequences of events that lead from possible initiating events 
to the undesired end state. These logical diagrams are necessary for both the 
qualitative and the quantitative evaluation of the risk associated to each accident 
scenario. 
• Finally, the probability associated to each accident scenario is computed and the 
scenarios are ranked based on their expected frequency of occurrence 
[Apostolakis, 2004]. The probabilities associated which each event transition 
that can lead from the initiating event to the end state are computed by means of 
empirical data on the process and of expert opinion. Because of the sparsity of 
 16 
relevant empirical data [Mosleh et al., 1988], some degree of expert opinion is 
often a fundamental pre-requisite of any PRA effort.  
 
 The results obtained from the application of PRA support and provide insight 
for any risk-informed decision and regulation. PRA modeling can be a massive task, 
and it is generally done by abstracting and clustering the events under consideration 
into classes and categories [Mosleh, 2014]. A certain familiarity with PRA tools is 
required for anyone interested in risk analysis and safety issues, and a vast literature is 
available together with specialized software tools for its application. 
2.2.2 Open Challenges and Limitations  
 Despite its appeal, PRA is not without its flaws, and in recent years researchers 
have highlighted some of its limitations and proposed several improvements [Aldemir, 
2013; Mosleh, 2014; Zio, 2014]. Those can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Timing and ordering considerations: the static logic models used in traditional 
PRA are insensitive to dynamic process failures. For instance, when multiple 
top events are considered in a fault tree, “the actual final state of a [truly] 
dynamic scenario depends on the order, timing, and magnitude of the 
component failure events” [Zio, 2014], which traditional fault trees cannot 
capture. Similar arguments can be made with Event Trees. Given the scenario 
postulated and tested by the analyst, the order of occurrence of the failure events 
is pre-set resulting in potential vulnerable sequences that remain untested 
[Aldemir, 2013; Zio, 2014]. Additionally, recovery and other time-dependent 
performances cannot be combined into the static traditional PRA tools.  
• The inclusion of software failures: the issue is the understanding of how 
software failures will affect the overall system, and how to include these 
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considerations in risk assessment. Arguably, PRA has been “very much 
hardware oriented” [Mosleh, 2014]. A gap exists in current methods to account 
for software failures or contributions to accidents [Leveson, 1995; Favarò et al., 
2013] and model them with tools that are compatible with traditional PRA 
[Apostolakis, 2004; Kirschenbaum et al., 2009]. The need to leverage new tools 
and perspectives for software safety analysis has been argued by several authors 
[DOD, 2012; Zio, 2014; Mosleh, 2014]. 
• The issue of human response: Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is used to 
estimate the quantitative and qualitative contributions of human performance to 
the overall system reliability. Current approaches to HRA interface well with 
traditional PRA tools and are included in many risk assessment efforts [Swain, 
1990]. However, HRA does not account for modeling human response during 
the unfolding of an accident scenario [Mosleh, 2014]. Real-time analysis and/or 
simulation of the human performance are of paramount importance to estimate 
how operators’ actions affect the estimated frequencies of failure events (and 
hence the risk estimation). Additionally, the study of human response has close 
ties with the analysis of instrumentation design and layout, which provide the 
operator a feedback on the system status. New tools and approaches can aim at 
relating potential operator performance degradation to ineffective 
instrumentation layouts, with missing information or misleading interpretations 
of the signals coming from the plant during an accident unfolding.  
• The inclusion of physical models: current PRA tools have limited capacity for 
the integration of physical phenomena models (e.g., physics of failure, 
environment physics description) [Mosleh, 2014]. Whenever the physics behind 
failure mechanisms can be included, many restrictions are required in terms of 
simplification. This issue is related to the lack of a mathematical framework that 
can integrate and handle different domains of analysis at the same time. 
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• The issue of completeness: PRA is executed by means of abstracting events into 
classes and categories. The level of abstraction is dependent on the type of 
decisions that PRA is meant to support, the resources allocated to the PRA 
effort, and the state of the knowledge regarding the system [Mosleh, 2014]. 
Related to the level of clustering of the events and to the abstraction effort is the 
issue of how complete the PRA process is in terms of breath of coverage of the 
risk and accident scenarios, their depth of causality, and the fidelity in the 
definition of the basic events of the fault and event trees and their associated 
probabilities [Mosleh, 2014]. Additionally, the scenarios that are tested are 
postulated, hence developed a priori, by the analyst, so that traditional PRA 
cannot by itself discover new accident scenarios. 
 
 New techniques and approaches are currently under investigation to address 
some of these limitations. A brief overview of some of the most notable approaches 
follows. I divide them in two categories: those that fall under the heading of Dynamic 
PRA, and those that rely on the addition of time-properties and time-related 
considerations. The proposed approach falls at the intersection of the two as it combines 
aspects that are common to both categories, as will be presented in the next chapter.   
2.3 DPRA: an Answer to the Time-Dependency Limitations of PRA  
 Dynamic PRA comprises a set of simulation-based methods that combine 
deterministic and probabilistic approaches to account for the time-dependency of the 
events they try to model. For this reason, DPRA tools also go under the name of 
Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (IDPSA) [Zio, 2014]. DPRA 
can handle both continuous and discrete time, as well as hybrid systems, depending on 
the system model of choice [Aldemir, 2013].  Regardless of the method of choice, three 
basic inputs are needed for DPRA: 
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1) A time-dependent physical model of the system dynamics; 
2) A list of identified normal and abnormal system configurations; 
3) The transition probabilities among the normal and abnormal configurations (or a 
more complex model of the stochastic rules that govern each transition). 
 
 Kirschenbaum et al. [2009], Aldemir [2013], and Zio [2014] provide a survey of 
different DPRA methodologies including dynamic flowgraph methods, Markov/cell-to-
cell mapping techniques, and Petri nets. These techniques have the potential to uncover 
and identify plant vulnerabilities that were a-priori unknown, and that could not be 
considered with traditional PRA tools. DPRA enlarges the exploration of the possible 
accident scenarios space, by including ordering and timing of events [Zio, 2014]. 
Moreover, simulation-based approaches can provide insight into an accident 
phenomenology and its causal basis for different accident scenarios [Mosleh, 2014]. 
This is due to the fact that the sequencing of events is no longer pre-determined by the 
analyst, but derives from the stochastic simulation itself. 
 DPRA is not an alternative to the traditional PRA, but rather complementary. 
Traditional PRA is still used in conjunction with the more sophisticated, but more 
complex, simulations carried out in DPRA. On one hand, DPRA provides additional 
insight for complex systems; on the other hand, PRA provides a technique popular for 
its simplicity and clarity in communicating the results of risk assessments [Aldemir, 
2013]. Limitations and drawbacks of DPRA include: 
 
• Substantial efforts are needed to generate the data for the transition probabilities 
among the different configurations. Although DPRA seeks to reduce the need 
for expert judgment, expert opinions are still required. Additionally, the model 
input data is not always readily available, so that experimental testing and/or 
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components simulation may be required for the computation of the stochastic 
rules that regulate the system transitions. 
• The development of the system models can be computationally intensive. Many 
of the available modeling tools suffer from the number of states explosion 
problem, and the size of the system under consideration is limited by the current 
computational capabilities (see [Zio, 2014] for a discussion on possible 
solutions).  
• DPRA is a simulation-based methodology. This implies that the verification 
effort is never completely exhaustive (i.e., not all possible existing scenarios are 
tested). Generally, dominant-risk scenarios are given higher priority, but 
completeness of the testing effort is not guaranteed.  
• There are difficulties with the output post-processing and with the classification 
of the various accident scenarios generated by the tools (e.g., problems with 
clustering of scenarios by similarity of the event sequences and/or the end state 
of the system). The classification of the scenario is related to the capability of 
recognizing unanticipated scenarios [Zio, 2014]. Additional concerns regard 
what kind of output to generate for risk communication and how to organize and 
communicate the data produced by the simulation in a clear manner.  
 
 DPRA is still far from being broadly adopted as an industrial practice, and 
considerable research remains underway in this field. Benchmark examples continue to 
be developed for the consistent comparison of the different risk assessment 
methodologies [Kirschenbaum et al., 2009; Aldemir et al., 2010].   
2.4 Current Approaches Involving the Use of Temporal Properties  
 Dynamic PRA has not been the only answer provided by the risk and safety 
community to the previously highlighted limitations of its static counterpart. With the 
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increasing importance of digital systems, frameworks that leverage approaches derived 
from and inspired by those used in computer science have also surfaced in the academic 
literature. These approaches introduce formal languages for the definition of temporal 
properties to be used in conjunction with the tools of static PRA. Some notable works 
in this area is briefly reviewed here.  
 
• Fault Trees (FT) temporal extensions: I denote under this heading works aimed 
at extending the classical fault tree analysis within traditional PRA. Notable 
contributions in this regard have been made by [Hansen et al., 1998], [Palshikar, 
2002], and [Magott and Skrobanek, 2012]. The FT temporal extensions were 
achieved in several ways:  
− By adding temporal gates to the standard FT notation: in this approach 
new gates were added to the standard pool of static logical gates (e.g., 
AND, OR, XOR gates). The new gates activation is dependent on the 
particular sequence or duration of the events that are fed into them. For 
instance, the “Priority AND” gate requires the ordered occurrence of the 
events fed into it from left to right; the “For all t instants” gate requires 
that the events fed into it hold for t instants of time, basically translating 
into an AND gate of an event holding at t1, AND again holding at t2, 
AND so on up to time t. Additional examples of temporal gates can be 
found in [Hansen et al., 1998; Palshikar, 2002].  
− By adding time dependency in the events definition: rather than adding a 
temporal dependency inside the gate logic (as it was done for the 
temporal gates of the previous examples), this approach includes time-
related considerations inside the definition of the events that are then 
connected by static logical gates. A common way of doing this is by 
adding to each event description a duration interval. The duration 
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interval in turn affects the applicability of the logical gate. For instance, 
it can prevent an AND gate from being activated unless a minimal 
duration time for the event is achieved.  
 
 Although not always explicitly stated, these extensions make use of temporal 
logic (or some rudimentary form of it). In general, they do not require the user to 
be familiar with the formalities of TL and the techniques for the verification of TL 
properties. This makes their use simple and approachable, but it hinders the user 
from tapping into and benefitting from the full potential of these techniques.  
• Formal logics for the analysis of time-critical systems: these approaches introduce 
timed logics for the explicit expression of time-dependent considerations. Timed 
logics add temporal operators to the pool of classical operators from propositional 
and predicate logics. Different logics can be used for this purpose such as 
probabilistic computational tree logic [Johnson, 1995] or real-time logic [Jahanian 
and Mok, 1986, 1994]. The use of timed logics allows to reason about the ordering 
and timing of events and to specify the desired dynamical behavior of the system. 
Specifically, timed logics are used to express time-dependent system requirements 
and performance constraints. These approaches no longer make use of traditional 
PRA. They require a model for the system under consideration, such as in DPRA. 
Contributions that resort to timed logics for system properties specification are 
somewhat more infrequent in the literature when compared to the above-mentioned 
approaches that extend traditional PRA tools. A separate mention should be given to 
applications of timed logics to problems that are not strictly related to risk 
assessment, but still span safety applications. This is the case for instance of 
Johnson’s work on the use of formal methods for accident investigations [Johnson, 
2000], or the application of temporal logic to support human factors engineering 
[Johnson and Harrison, 1992]. 
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 The problem of including time considerations in the risk assessment process is 
tackled in the proposed approach by two complementary features: on the one side, the 
hazard levels or danger indices model dynamical quantities that enable, through the 
estimation of the time-to-accident metric, to account for time-dependent considerations 
for safety interventions; on the other side, the use of Temporal Logic (TL) allows the 
explicit inclusion of temporal ordering (through the use of TL operators) within the 
definition of safety properties that act as constraints for the dynamic behavior of the 
system [Favarò and Saleh, 2016a,b]. These two ingredients are separately introduced in 
the next chapters. Specifically, Chapter 3 tackles model-based hazard monitoring and 
presents an overview of the safety supervisory control framework; Chapter 4 tackles the 
adoption of TL to bear on risk assessment and system safety, and presents the 






SAFETY SUPERVISORY CONTROL FRAMEWORK AND 
MODEL-BASED HAZARD MONITORING 
 
 This chapter focuses on the ingredients of model-based system safety, the 
associated modeling of danger indices and hazard equations, and the creation of a 
hazard temporal contingency map. The integration of all these elements with the 
ingredient of Temporal Logic and safety properties verification (which is presented in 
detail in chapter 4) constitutes the novel safety supervisory control framework 
presented in Figure 1.2. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents in 
more detail the framework proposed, and analyzes the workflow for its adoption. 
Section 3.2 tackles the first step of the approach, i.e., the model development based on 
the state-space representation formalism. Section 3.3 introduces the notion of hazard 
level (or danger index) with detailed analytical examples related to its monitoring 
process. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter with the presentation of the hazard-temporal 
contingency mapping. 
3.1 The Safety Supervisory Control Framework 
 The framework proposed in this work adopts a model-based approach and state 
variables to capture the dynamics of hazard escalation and to monitor “danger indices” 
in the system. The identification and quantification of indices of proximity to adverse 
events supports the development of a safety supervisory control approach (shown in 
Figure 1.2 and reported here in Figure 3.1 for convenience), and it is particularly 
helpful for triggering pre-emptive safety interventions and improving accident 
prevention, as argued shortly. The continuous monitoring of the hazard level and the 
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estimation of the time-to-accident metric provide important feedback for various 
stakeholders, from management and designers, to front-line operators and technicians, 
to guide safety interventions over different time scales. The monitoring of the 
distinctive macro-state variables “hazard levels” during system operation (i.e., on-line) 
provides important feedback for operators to recognize a developing adverse situation, 
prioritize attention, and allocate defensive resources for safety interventions and hazard 
de-escalation. Additionally, the off-line application of the safety supervisory process 
can assist in checking the presence/adequacy of safety features implemented in the 
system, providing an important feedback during the design stages. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of model-based safety supervisory control, and dynamic hazard monitoring for 
safety interventions (not meant to be exhaustive; several loops and blocks are not shown to avoid clutter) 
 The elements of Figure 3.1 are described in detail next, together with the 







































































 The system model block in the bottom right corner includes the state-space 
model of the system under consideration (the “plant” block) and a “system controller” 
within an inner loop (e.g., a digital controller, a human controller, or a combination of 
both for varying degrees of automation). The controller provides inputs to the plant, 
seeking to ensure that the system fulfills its performance requirements (to behave “as 
expected”) and to steer it away from off-nominal hazardous conditions. The reference 
inputs to the system model block (the input to the comparator upstream the controller 
box in Figure 3.1) depend on performance and production requirements, as well as the 
safety requirements and constraints.  
 Output measurements and system state estimations are undertaken downstream 
of the “system model” (not shown in a separate “observer” block so as not to further 
clutter the figure). These measurements and state estimation are fed into the macro-
block entitled safety supervisory monitoring where several functions are performed: 
 
i. Hazard identification and state mapping: The hazard level or danger index is an 
analytic metric for capturing accident escalation, and it reflects the proximity of 
the system to a particular adverse event (details in 3.3). This block identifies the 
hazards of interest and maps them into (a subset of) the state variables of the 
system. The hazard level depends on the system state variables, and this block 
provides the model and connection between these two analytical concepts. 
Examples of the mathematical equations that represent the mapping between 
system states and hazard levels are presented in Section 3.3. Multiple hazard 
levels (for various risks) are considered at a time, and they are reflected in the 
vector output H(t) of the Hazard Identification block in Figure 3.1.  
ii. Hazard level monitoring: Once the hazard level metrics are defined, they are to 
be continuously monitored (either by the operator or through an automated 
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process). Monitoring the values and trends of the hazard levels is an important 
step for the prioritization and triggering of safety interventions. 
iii. TL expression of safety properties (chapter 4): This step accounts for the 
translation of system safety requirements into TL formulae. These formulae in 
turn act as constraints on the system behavior. Each safety property is predicated 
on a particular hazard level function, making the monitoring of the hazard level 
a fundamental step for the definition and verification of each TL formula.  
iv. Verification of the TL safety properties (chapters 4 and 5): The TL safety 
properties are continuously checked for compliance/violation. The violation of a 
safety constraint provides diagnostic information for re-engineering the system 
design, the safety barriers layout, and the system instrumentation, to mention a 
few possible types of safety interventions that can be triggered by this 
verification. 
 
 The end-objective of the safety supervisory block is to support decision-making, 
especially in relation to safety interventions on the system, and to improve accident 
prevention. The functions and blocks discussed in (i–iv) are some of the means for 
contributing to this end-objective. One particularly important tool in support of this end 
is shown in Figure 3.1 downstream the safety supervisory block and is entitled Hazard 
temporal contingency analysis (and map). This block is both an analysis and 
visualization tool: it dynamically assesses and displays the “coordinates” of hazards in a 
system to support operators’ sensemaking and help them prioritize attention and 
defensive resources for accident prevention. The coordinates of hazards include the 
hazard level or danger index (how hazardous a particular situation is) and an estimated 
time-to-accident metric (how much time is left before the accident associated with a 
particular hazard is released if no changes are made to the system operation). The 
hazard temporal contingency map provides prognostic information regarding the time-
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window available for operators to intervene before a hazardous situation becomes 
unrecoverable, and in so doing it helps prioritize risks and hazards based on their 
temporal contingency, not based on probability, or some combination of probability and 
consequence, as is traditionally done in PRA. 
 This safety supervisory and hazard temporal contingency blocks are not only 
helpful for system operators, they also affect various stakeholders involved in the safety 
value chain3 of the system. The outer loop in Figure 3.1 closes back on the system by 
providing the hazard information (dynamics/trends) to different stakeholders, and 
prompts them to assess the need for and trigger multi-tiered safety interventions. These 
interventions can range from immediate actions (e.g., emergency shutdown, adjustment 
of safety barriers, or safety-related maintenance) to off-line re-engineering of safety 
features in the system design, the system instrumentation, or the operating procedures 
for example. These changes affect the system model block both in terms of the plant 
description (state space model) and of the controller definition and operations, thus 
closing the outer feedback loop in Figure 3.1. The model-based safety supervisory 
control and the hazard temporal contingency map support safety interventions over 
different time-scales and by different agents in the safety value chain. Finally as noted 
in the caption, Figure 3.1 is not meant to be exhaustive; several blocks and additional 
feedback loops are not displayed to avoid visual clutter (for example the “observer and 
state estimation block, and the feedback loops for monitoring the effectiveness of the 
safety interventions).  
 These considerations are revisited in detail in the next subsections. Three key 
steps can be highlighted in the process here described and are analyzed next:   
                                                
 
 
3 The safety value chain consists of individuals or groups who contribute to accident prevention and 
sustainment of system safety. It includes operators, technicians, engineers, system designers, managers 
and executives, regulators, safety inspectors, and accident investigators, individuals who affect and 
contribute to system safety over different time-scales [Saleh et al., 2010]. 
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1. System model development: development of a mathematical model for the 
dynamical system under consideration (or for a subset of the system with the 
safety implications of interest), with identification of state variables and state-
space representation (Section 3.2); 
2. Safety supervisory monitoring: identification of the hazard levels or danger 
indices of interest and state mapping, along with the continuous monitoring of 
these indices (Section 3.2); 
3. Hazard temporal contingency analysis (and map) to guide safety 
interventions: estimation of the time-to-accident metric and development of the 
hazard temporal contingency map, for ranking and prioritization of safety 
interventions (Section 3.4). 
3.2 Model Development 
 The creation of a model for the dynamical system under consideration 
constitutes the first step of the approach. Similar to Hansen’s [1998] work on the 
extension of temporal fault trees, the framework here proposed makes use of state 
variables (either continuous or discrete) denoting functions of time, as in Modern 
Control Theory. As highlighted in [Cowlagi and Saleh, 2013], although well-
established safety strategies such as defense-in-depth “reflect an implicit recognition of 
accident prevention as a control problem” and several authors have articulated and 
developed this recognition more explicitly [Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2004], actual 
control theory has been to a large extent absent from the discussion of safety as a 
control problem. In the following, I make use of some tools from the actual Control 
discipline, in particular with references to state-space representations of dynamical 
systems and state estimation. Given the need of a system model, the proposed 
framework falls under the category of model-based safety analysis, which is briefly 
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reviewed next. Afterwards, the state-space formalisms is introduced together with an 
example model.  
3.2.1 Model-Based Safety Analysis 
 A dynamical system is one whose properties (or a subset of them) change with 
time. A model for such system is defined as a set of equations that represent its 
behavior in time. Once an analytical model is developed, it can be translated/imported 
into a simulation environment for various types of analyses. 
 In simple terms, whenever a mathematical model is developed and employed for 
the analysis of the system under consideration (instead of carrying out experiments on 
the actual system), the approach is referred to as a model-based analysis. Specifically, 
model-based safety analysis has gained popularity over the past decade. It was first 
introduced to provide a more formal approach for analysis techniques that had 
traditionally been performed manually, with a low likelihood of being complete, 
consistent and error-free [Joshi and Heimdahl, 2005]. 
 The main benefit of model-based analysis is the possibility of interfacing the 
system model(s) with automated analysis tools that can analyze the system behavior, 
allowing the verification of different aspects of fault tolerance and potentially the auto-
generation of different outputs (e.g., fault trees) [Joshi and Heimdahl, 2005], and the 
repeatability of the analyses. 
 Many of the early efforts in model-based safety analysis were aimed at the auto-
generation of PRA-types of analysis (see for instance [Papadopoulos et al., 2001]). The 
interest then expanded towards automated fault-detection and diagnosis [Isermann, 
2005], and to the introduction of formal verification of the models to improve system 
reliability [Bozzano and Villafiorita, 2003; Bozzano et al., 2003]. The need for novel 
model-based techniques was justified by the increasing complexity of the systems under 
consideration, and by the need of safety engineers to assess the system behavior in 
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degraded situations without the need to manually develop for example an extensive set 
of fault trees [Bozzano and Villafiorita, 2003]. 
 In the following, I build on ideas from model-based safety analysis, with the 
distinction that they are not employed in conjunction with PRA tools and techniques, 
but for the proposed safety supervisory control approach, providing operators and other 
stakeholders with the means to continuously monitor the system for hazardous 
conditions and scan for potential unfolding adverse events. The following approach 
leverages the state-space representation formalism, which is briefly reviewed next.  
3.2.2 State-Space Representation 
 The state-space representation is a mathematical formalism widely used in 
Modern Control Theory. It is concerned with three types of variables (all functions of 
time): input variables (denoted by the vector u(t)), output variables (denoted by the 
vector y(t)), and state variables (denoted by the vector x(t)). Inputs and outputs are the 
means by which an external agent can interact with the system: the appropriate control 
actions are applied through the inputs to ensure the desired system behavior, which in 
turn is monitored through the output recording and state estimation [Bakolas and Saleh, 
2011]. State variables (or simply the “state” of a system) are formally defined as the 
minimum set of variables that contain all the necessary information of the internal 
conditions of a system at some time t0, such that the knowledge of the system state at 
time t0 along with the knowledge of the input vector u(t) for t ≥ t0 is sufficient to 
determine all the system future outputs (for t ≥ t0) [Chen, 1995]. 
 A dynamical system can then be represented in terms of its state-space 
representation through a system of first order differential equations, such as those of Eq. 
(3.1).  
 
𝐱 t = F(𝐱 t ,𝐮 t )                          state  equation




 F and G are generic functions (linear or non-linear) that relate on the one hand 
the rate of change of the state to the state itself and the input vector (state equation), and 
on the other hand the output vector to state vector and input vector (output equation). 
Equation (3.1a) holds for continuous systems, and can be easily generalized for discrete 
cases. For the case of linear systems, Eq. (3.1a) assumes the well-known form: 
 
𝐱 t = A𝐱 t + B𝐮 t
𝐲 t = C𝐱 t + D𝐮 t    (3.1b) 
 
where the matrices A, B, C, and D may also be dependent on time.  
 The role of state variables is central to the discussion, and it will enable the 
definition of a quantifiable metric for accident escalation, the hazard level function or 
danger index. The hazards of interest for the system are mapped into (a subset of) the 
system state variables. A simple example is provided next to clarify some of these 
concepts and the application of the process described in Figure 3.1.  
 Figure 3.2 shows a schematic of a cylindrical oil tank, with an incoming mass 
flow m!"(t), and mass outflow m!"#(t). Valves in the feeding and in the outflow line 
regulate the two mass flows. From the perspective of safety supervisory control, the 
role of the operator is to monitor the condition of the oil tank, and to apply control 
actions to steer the system away from dangerous situations should they develop. For 
instance, for a system such as that of Figure 3.2 we may want to ensure that: (i) a 
certain threshold height of oil inside the tower is never (b)reached or simply that the 
tower does not overflow; and (ii) that correct instrumentation and alarms are set up to 
inform the operator of potential problems or escalating hazard level in a timely manner. 
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Violation of both these considerations let to the explosion at the Texas City refinery in 




Figure 3.2 Schematic representation of an oil tank 
 
 The distinction between the two considerations, (i) and (ii), is subtle but 
important: the first requires the operator to monitor the height of the oil in the tower 
(h(t) in Figure 3.2). In the proposed framework, it is possible to set up the oil height to 
be one of the system state variables, and then map it into a hazard level function. 
Monitoring the current value of the oil height against specific thresholds, and allowing 
the operators the use of appropriate control actions (e.g., regulating the incoming mass 
flow, or closing/opening the outflow line) provides the operator with the information 
needed to satisfy the first property. The second property is instead related to the notion 
of observability-in-depth and the ability to correctly diagnose the hazard level 
associated with the system, and is presented in detail in chapter 4.  
 The model of the system can be set up in the following way. For simplicity, a 
one-dimensional problem is here considered, with the height of oil inside the tower 









mass flow m!"(t), and the possibility to open up or close out the outflow line (hence 
zeroing out the outflow cross-section area, B in Figure 3.2).  The output is given by the 
mass outflow m!"#(t). We have: 
 
x t → h t                                                                                     
y t →   m!"# t                                                                     
u! t →   m!"(t)
u! t → B(t)            
     → 𝐮 t =   
u!(t)
u!(t)
    (3.2) 
  
 To set up a state-space model, the first step is to consider the mathematical 
model of the physics governing the system under consideration. The mass balance for 




=    !
!
   m!" t −m!"#(t)     (3.3) 
 
with V being the volume of oil filling the tank, and where for simplicity the density of 
the oil is considered to be a constant 𝜌. Given a constant cross-sectional area A for the 




=    !
!!
   m!" t −m!"#(t)     (3.4) 
 
 The outflow can be expressed as 
 
m!"#(t) =   B(t)ρ   2gh(t)     (3.5) 
 
where 2gh(t) represents the velocity of the fluid in the outflow pipe assuming a 
constant acceleration g for the incoming mass flow. The differential equation governing 






=    !
!!
   m!" t − B(t)ρ   2gh(t)               (3.6) 
 
 It is now possible to obtain the non-linear state-space representation of the 
dynamical system of Figure 3.2 by considering the choice of states, outputs, and inputs 
provided in Eq. (3.2): 
 
x   t = !
!!
   u! t − u! t ρ   2g  x(t)
y t = u! t ρ   2g  x t                                               
   (3.7) 
 
The model of Eq. (3.7) is the basis for the application of the safety supervisory 
monitoring analysis that follows according to Figure 3.1. The state-space representation 
is a powerful tool for modeling a significantly broad range of dynamical systems. The 
choice of which variables to select as states of the system is not unique, and in this case 
is dependent on and informed by the particular hazards to be monitored and safety 
constraints under consideration. In model-based approaches, the analytical expression 
of the model (such as that of Eq. (3.7)) is then translated/imported in a simulation 
environment, and it enables a broad range of uses such as controller design, (hazard) 
monitoring, and diagnostic. 
3.3 Safety Supervisory Monitoring 
 This section analyzes in detail the safety supervisory monitoring block of Figure 
3.1, focusing on the following two steps: (i) the hazard level(s) identification and its 
mapping into the system state (section 3.3.1), and (ii) the execution of the monitoring 
process (section 3.3.2). Section 3.3.3 presents the application of the hazard monitoring 
process to a rejected takeoff scenario, to exemplify its use and capabilities.  
3.3.1 Hazard Level Identification and State Mapping 
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 The hazard level, denoted by H(t), can be intuitively conceived of as the 
closeness of an accident to being released [Saleh et al., 2014a]. Its definition provides 
an index to quantify “how dangerous” the current system state is, in terms of its 
proximity to an accident occurrence. In the following the terms hazard level and danger 
index are used interchangeably.  
 In order to define the function H(t), the first thing is to specify what accident to 
monitor against. For instance, in the oil tank example presented in Figure 3.2, 
monitoring against the accident “loss of containment (LoC) through tower overflow” 
suggests that a suitable danger index maps the state of the system “oil height h(t)” 
against the maximum height picked as threshold. This is captured by 
 
      𝐻!"# 𝑡 =   
!(!)
!!"#
        (3.8) 
 
where the height of raffinate at time t is divided by the maximum achievable height 
before overflow occurs, so that the resulting hazard level is dimensionless. The 
situation H(t) = 1 indicates then overflow of the tower or the onset of the accident “loss 
of containment”. 
 More generally, a series of adverse events that bring a system from its nominal 
operational conditions to off-nominal ones and finally to an accident occurrence can be 
reflected by the dynamics of the hazard level over time (an illustrative example is 
shown in Figure 3.3). The dynamics of the hazard level is not necessarily monotonic, 
and it can consist in a sequence of escalation, de-escalation, and constancy phases4. 
                                                
 
 
4 Note that discontinuities (e.g., jumps) in the hazard level function H(t) may exist. In those cases, the 
definition of the hazard level dynamics can be interpreted in a discrete sense as ∆H ∆t. In the practical 
implementation of the verification process (which is executed in a simulation environment), the 
definition of the derivative of the hazard level is always discretized.  
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Figure 3.3 Illustration of hazard level dynamics 
 
 More complex danger indices can also be devised for the tower example in 
Figure 3.2, for instance by accounting for the velocity at which the tower is filling up, 
or by considering multiple states such as pressure (p(t)) and temperature (T(t)) of the 
oil. For example, one can set up a limit for maximum temperature inside the tower 
(Tmax), where also the temperature change due to changing height and pressure of the oil 
inside the tower is taken into account6:  
 







      (3.9) 
 
 The idea of introducing a quantitative index for capturing the hazardousness of a 
situation is not novel. It is well established and particularly useful in the field of human-
robot interaction [Ikuta et al., 2003; Kulić and Croft, 2005] where “danger indices” are 
                                                
 
 
5 Appendix C examines the notion of Agonist, Antagonist and Inverse Agonist that are in a sense 
responsible for the three dynamic behavior of the hazard level examined in Figure 3.3. 
6 Equation (3.9) assumes an isentropic process. 𝛼 is the volumetric thermal expansion coefficient, cp is the 








devised based on the distance between the agents involved (e.g., patient and robot for 
human care) and the relative velocity to identify situations in which safety is 
compromised. For instance, in [Kulić and Croft, 2005] expressions of the following 
kind appear for the definition of danger levels:  
 
“If	  (Distance	  =	  LOW)	  and	  (Velocity	  =	  HIGH)	  -­‐>	  	  (DANGER	  =	  HIGH)”	  
 
Similarly to what was done in Eq. (3.8), Ikuta et al. [2003] proposed a danger index 𝛼 
based on the force of a potential impact, compared to a critical impact force, where the 
force is dependent on the velocity, the distance, the shape, and the mass of the agents 
involved: 
 
      𝛼 =      !  (!,!,!,!)
!!
        (3.10) 
 
 These danger evaluation methods are aimed at establishing quantitative metrics 
to measure and control the hazardousness of a situation during system operation, and to 
minimize the danger involved in robot tasks.  I propose here their extension beyond the 
specific field of human-robot interactions. These methods are an important tool in 
support of accident prevention and for sustaining system safety. Regardless of the 
specifics of their definition, the notion of quantifiable danger indices is a powerful one, 
and it adds a real-time dimension to the problem of risk assessment and hazard 
monitoring; it is also an important piece in the view of safety as a control problem 
(since accident prevention requires maintaining danger indices within safe bounds).  
 In the proposed approach the definition of the hazard level is dependent on (a 
subset of) the state of the system. Equations such as (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) can be 
generalized in the case of a N-dimensional state vector by the functional definition: 
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𝐻 𝑡 =   𝑓 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥! , 𝑡                                    (3.11) 
 
 The estimation of the system state enables to measure the proximity to particular 
adverse events, an important step for accident prevention. Other authors have in the past 
advocated the need to include state variables dependencies in the notion of risk. For 
example, according to Haimes [2009] the reason why a universally agreed-upon 
definition of risk, a complex multidimensional concept, is still lacking is to be found in 
the missing understanding of some requisite ingredients, such as the state variables of 
the system. As the “performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state 
vector” [Haimes, 2009], then by the same token so is the safety or lack thereof and the 
hazardous condition of the system at any point in time. The notion of a danger index 
enables one to make explicit this (dynamic) risk dependence on the state vector of the 
system, and it becomes important to ensure the proper control of the system. 
 Based on the previous considerations, the proposed model-based approach can 
augment the system model shown in Eq. (3.1) with an additional hazard equation, 
which captures the dependency of the hazard level on (a subset of) the state vector x(t), 
and of the dynamics of the hazard level on the control variables u(t). For the case of 
linear systems we obtain: 
 
x t = Ax(t)   +   Bu(t)                                state  equation  
y t = Cx(t)   +   Du(t)                          output  equation  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐
H(t) =   Φx(t)+Ψu(t)                        hazard  equation
             (3.12) 
 
where the matrix Φ derives from the mapping of the hazard level into the state vector 
and the matrix Ψ embodies the dependence of the hazard level dynamics on the inputs 
vector. Adjusting the values of the matrix Ψ (whether done “manually” by the operator, 
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or through an automated controller) results in different control actions on the hazard 
level. This process, called input shaping, is generally carried out in modern control 
theory to achieve specific performance goals. In this case, input shaping for the hazard 
equation allows to control the system and steer it away from dangerous conditions (e.g., 
de-escalate hazardous levels).  
 For many years, the guiding principle behind the control synthesis problem was 
that of output feedback (i.e., the observation of the system output). After the seminal 
works of Kalman [1960] and Bellman [1957], it became evident that the selection of 
control inputs is more efficient when based on the knowledge of the actual internal state 
of the system, rather than on its output [Bakolas and Saleh, 2011]. This consideration is 
reflected in the proposed approach in the mapping of the state vector into the hazard 
level, and thus in the fundamental role of state estimation to capture the dynamics of the 
danger indices. The process of hazard monitoring is thus a form of state estimation, and 
it provides the proper feedback upon which to base control actions for safety 
interventions. 
 A final remark is worth noting. The hazard level provides an index of accident 
escalation, regardless of the sequence of events that leads to that particular accident. In 
other words, the hazard level spans every sequence and scenario of escalation that will 
lead to such an accident occurring. The choice of setting up a metric based on the 
system state (i.e., a proxy of its internal condition) allows to eliminate the path-
dependency implicit in traditional PRA, where the computation of the conditional 
probabilities that lead to an accident occurrence has to account for the specific path 
followed by the system.  
 In general, an accident sequence can be viewed as a string of events, starting 
from an initiating event (IE) that leads the system into off-nominal conditions of 
operations and leading to an accident (A). For instance, in Figure 3.4 the string that 
starts with the initiating event IE1 and terminated in the accident state Ak is written as: 
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s!,! =     IE!e!e!… e!A!     (3.13) 
 
where each event (e) in the sequence provided by Eq. (3.13) presents one subscript that 
identifies its position inside the string s. As indicated in Figure 3.4, multiple possible 
paths exist between different initiating events and accident states. The conditional 
probability of accident Ak occurring given the occurrence of the initiating event IEi can 
be written as p(Ak|IEi). This conditional probability is the sum over all paths starting 
from IEi and leading to Ak, and it is a key ingredient in PRA. 
 At a local level, given that an accident sequence has been initiated, the 
conditional probability that it will further advance or escalate is reflected in the 
conditional probability 
 
p e!!! e!       or  generally      p e! e!)      for  k > i     (3.14) 
 
 


















 Traditional quantitative risk analysis involves the computation of the conditional 
probability associated with each scenario that leads to the occurrence of accident A. At 
its core risk analysis is the imagination of failure, and a significant effort is required to 
conceive of the many possible ways accidents can unfold. For each accident scenario, a 
probability like the one of Eq. (3.15), based on the scenario expressed by Eq. (3.13), 
needs to be computed.  
 
p(s!,!) =     p(IE!) ∙ p(e!|IE!) ∙ p(e!|e!)…p(A!|e!)   (3.15) 
 
 The approach proposed strikes then for its simplicity in handling the 
computation of the proximity to accident A (and the ensuing time-to-accident metric 
that is analyzed in section 3.4) regardless of the particular sequence of events followed 
by the system. In short, danger indices are agnostic to the series of events that led to 
their particular value at any given instant of time, and as such they are independent on 
the specific accident trajectory followed by the system. The set up of danger indices for 
the system hence shifts the reliance of the risk assessment process from the 
identification of all possible accident trajectories and their associated probabilities to 
the identification of suitable hazard levels, whose choice is informed by the particular 
safety requirements imposed for the system. 
3.3.2 Hazard Level Monitoring 
 The last step in the Safety Supervisory block in Figure 3.1 is the hazard level 
monitoring. To illustrate its role, consider the first requirement that was set up for the 
oil tank example, i.e., ensuring that the tower does not overflow. Intuitively, the 
implementation of this requirement in a quantifiable form implies the verification of the 
following constraint for the hazard level: 
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𝐻 𝑡 < 𝐻!      (3.16) 
 
where HA represents the hazard level associated with the onset of the accident “loss of 
containment”, thus HA = 1 in the example of H(t) provided in Eq. (3.8). Properties such 
as that expressed in Eq. (3.16) allow the set up of safety bounds (or safety envelopes for 
higher dimensions than 1D) and criticality thresholds for the hazard level. Safety 
margins can also be accounted for in the definition of the threshold values, so that in 
general it is required that  𝐻 𝑡 <   𝐻!"#$, for a pre-defined Hcrit criticality threshold.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Hazard level dynamics for the oil tank example and comparison with criticality thresholds 
 
 Continuous monitoring of the hazard level informs the operators of developing 
dangerous situations, and thus supports their situational awareness by capturing the 
specific hazard dynamics and escalation (and the particular accident the system is 
approaching). As an illustration, Figure 3.5 provides an example of hazard level 
Accident(occurrence(
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dynamics for the oil tank example, compared in this case to three criticality thresholds: 
one corresponding to 70% of the tower filled up (Hcrit1), one corresponding to 90% of 
the tower filled up (Hcrit2), and one corresponding to actual overflow conditions (HA). In 
the case of Figure 4, the hazard level value is obtained by computing the height of oil 
inside the tower through direct integration of Eq. (3.7), using as input values a constant 
incoming mass flow of 35 kg/s and considering a partially closed outflow line.  
 Plots such as the one of Figure 3.5 can serve as a diagnostic tool to inform on-
line safety interventions. For instance, in this case a value of H(t) too close to a critical 
threshold Hcrit, and a sustained positive slope for H(t), suggests to the operator that a 
safety intervention is warranted—at a minimum to block the dynamics of hazard 
escalation through emergency shutdown for example, or fully open the outflow line to 
de-escalate the hazardousness of the situation and decrease the height of the oil in the 
tower away from the critical thresholds. This corresponds (from a control/mathematical 
perspective) to adjusting the values of the control matrix Ψ in the hazard equation. By 
comparing the current value of H(t) to the criticality thresholds, the operator is also 
enabled to get a real-time estimate of the time when the thresholds will be (b)reached, 
as examined in the next section.  
 When the hazard level monitoring is executed off-line, a detailed analysis of the 
history of hazard dynamics can help answer important questions regarding on the one 
hand, the occurrence and ranking of near misses (frequency and severity or 
hazardousness—how close the situation got to critical thresholds), and on the other 
hand, the identification of missing or ineffective safety features, that allowed the 
increase in the hazard level, including inadequate operator training. Although the 
following topic is tangential to the purposes of this work, I believe the connection 
between the proposed safety supervisory control and model-based hazard monitoring on 
the one hand, and near miss management systems on the other hand [Gnoni and Lettera, 
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2012; Gnoni et al., 2013] offer many possibilities for meaningful contributions and is a 
rich area for further research and investigation. 
 To further illustrate the capabilities and insight that can be derived from the 
hazard monitoring process, the next subsection provides an application of the presented 
tools in support of the “go/no-go” decision-making in rejected takeoff situations (RTO), 
which will be instrumental for the analysis of chapter 5. 
3.3.3 Example Application of H(t) Monitoring 
 Traditionally the thinking about the problem of setting regulations and policies 
for rejecting a takeoff has revolved around the notion of the decision speed V1. Pilots 
are advised against rejecting a takeoff after the decision speed V1 is achieved unless 
they have reason to believe “the aircraft cannot be safely airborne” [ECAST, 2016]. 
 Statistics show that there is more to the “go/no-go” decision than the simple 
“stop before V1” and “go after V1” strategy [TSTA, 2016]. The fact that the V1 limit is 
not sufficient in of itself is recognized by both air manufacturers and regulators, who 
advocate new metrics to expand on the current thinking about these issues. For instance 
[Airbus, 2005] shows that about 54% of runway excursions occur when RTOs are 
initiated at speed above V1, but also highlight that about 26% of them occur for RTOs 
initiated below V1.   
 The set up of hazard levels and criticality thresholds can support pilots in their 
decision to reject the takeoff versus “take the problem into the air” strategies. Consider 
for instance the hazard level defined in Eq. (3.17). 
 
𝐻 𝑡 = !!"#$ !
!!"#!!!"#$!!(!)
    (3.17) 
 
 This hazard level quantifies and relates the distance required for the aircraft to 
come to a stop (once a RTO is initiated) to the total length available to the aircraft 
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before encountering an obstacle on its path. This length is computed as the runway 
length still available (given by the runway length lrun minus the distance already 
traveled d(t)) plus the runway end safety area (dRESA)7. Rather than defining the 
accident as a simple runway overrun, this danger index identifies the accident as that 
condition for which the stopping distance required would bring the aircraft beyond the 
limit of the RESA. In other words, the situation H(t) = 1 would thus identify either a 
collision with an obstacle and/or the encounter of  highly uneven terrain.  
 The calculation of the stopping distance dSTOP(t) depends on several factors, 
such as the velocity at which the RTO is initiated, the position of the aircraft along the 
runway, the conditions of the runway (e.g., wet, dry,...), and the availability of the 
brakes and thrust reversers among other things. In order to compute such distance, it is 
necessary to set up a model for the aircraft dynamics during the RTO. For simplicity, 
only the longitudinal motion of the aircraft along the runway is considered, and some 
simplifications for the aerodynamic coefficients of interest are made. The governing 





= T− D−   µμ! W− L     (3.18) 
 
m is the vehicle mass; T the thrust provided by the engine(s); D the drag, and it is 
dependent on the aircraft configuration (e.g., with flaps and slats deployed) and the 
velocity !"
!"
; µμ! is the rolling friction coefficient (and for the RTO case its increase 
models the brakes application); W is the aircraft weight; L the lift. Equation (3.18) can 
be translated in the state-space representation formalisms as follows: 
                                                
 
 
7 The runway end safety area (RESA) accounts for an additional region beyond the end of the runway 
before sudden changes in the terrain gradient and/or obstacles are encountered.  
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x! t = x! t                                                                                         
x!(t) =   
! ! !! !!(!) !  !! ! (  !!! !!(!) )
!
     (3.19) 
 
where the first state x1 represents the distance traveled along the runway (x-axis), and 
the second state x2  the instantaneous velocity of the aircraft. The following plots are 
obtained applying the model to the data of a Learjet 60. The following assumptions are 
considered: full braking power and thrust reversers are available, and the runway is dry.  
 
Figure 3.6 Contours of the hazard level of Eq. (3.17) plotted as a function of  
the initial conditions for the RTO 
 The model of Eq. (3.19) is integrated to compute distance, velocity, and 
acceleration of the aircraft at any point in time. Specifically for the RTO, when brakes 
and thrust reversers are applied, the stopping distance is computed as the distance 













initial conditions, i.e., for a range of different velocities v0 and positions along the 
runway d0 at which the RTO is initiated. Plotting the hazard level as a function of these 
initial conditions (which is normalized for convenience with respect to V1 and to the 
runway length) yields plots such as the one of Figure 3.6, where two criticality 
thresholds are highlighted. The first threshold represents situations in which the aircraft 
comes to a stop within a 15% safety margin from the end of the RESA, while the 
second threshold corresponds to the accident unfolding.  
 The accident threshold HA = 1 can be compared to the traditional limit imposed 
on the decision speed V1 (Figure 3.7).  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Contours of the hazard level of Eq. (3.17) and comparison with V1 limit 
 Figure 3.7 provides a clear visualization of how the metric established by Eq. 
(3.17) informs traditional approaches for the RTO decision-making problem. 
Specifically, by accounting for the stopping distance dependence on the state of the 
system when the RTO is initiated (in terms of velocity and position), the selected 

















still result in an accident, and situations for which RTOs are initiated above V1 that do 
not.  
 Finally, Figure 3.8 superimposes a typical aircraft trajectory during takeoff to 
the mapping of Figure 3.7. It can be seen that for this particular scenario (dry runway 
and thrust reversers deployed), the trajectory briefly enters the new “danger area” 
highlighted in Figure 3.7. More so will be in the case when full braking power is not 
available, or the runway conditions are less than ideal. As the possibility of an RTO 
should always be considered by the pilots before the initiation of takeoff procedures, a 
situation such as the one of Figure 3.8 can advise the pilots to reconsider the suitability 
of that particular runway and/or make sure that the entire available length of the runway 
is exploited (e.g., not starting the takeoff from an intersection with a taxiway).  
 















 Metrics and diagnostic tools such as the one here considered can also be 
employed by regulators and policy makers to inform safety guidelines, and at the same 
time they can be applied on-line to support real-time decision-making in critical 
situations. Research is required for their adaptation to different contexts and several 
interesting research opportunities arise (for instance, in the proposed case, in relation to 
the devise of avionics development and user interface/displays in support of the 
proposed metrics). The safety supervisory monitoring process presented in this section 
offers many advantages that complement the traditional approaches to risk assessment. 
Other than the diagnostic information presented in this section, the continuous 
monitoring of the hazard level within a model-based approach supports a prognostic 
dimension as well, which is introduced next. 
3.4 Hazard Temporal Contingency Analysis 
 This step is shown downstream of the safety supervisory monitoring block in 
Figure 3.1. It is shown as a separate entity to highlight its importance. The development 
of a hazard equation (Eq. 3.12), which is enabled by the adoption of a model-based 
approach, allows one to estimate the time at which critical thresholds for the hazard 
level are (b)reached. This estimation process provides prognostic information and 
produces a proxy for a time-to-accident metric or advance notice for an impending 
adverse event. This temporal metric8 can also be construed as providing an estimate for 
the time-window available for safety interventions, assuming no changes are made to 
the system operation/inputs. This helps with the identification of the temporal criticality 
                                                
 
 
8 The time-to-accident metric can be described as a random variable, or more appropriately a stochastic 
process. One objective of a dynamic risk assessment and accident prevention is to monitor and control the 
set of such metrics in a system, and keep them at a safe temporal distance away from 0. 
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of different hazards on the one hand, and the prioritization of attention and defensive 
resources for hazards that warrant more timely intervention on the other hand.  
 To illustrate this estimation process, consider one more time the oil tank 
example. Given the current value of the hazard level at time te (the time at which the 
estimation will take place), the remaining time before the LoC accident occurs, 
assuming no change of inputs, can be derived using various estimators, the simplest one 
is expressed as follows:  
 
      𝛥T!"# t! =
!!"#!!(!!)
!(!!)
=    !!!!"#(!!)
!!"#(!!)
    (3.20) 
 
 
 The knowledge of these two “coordinates” of a hazard, HLoC(te) and ΔTLoC(te), 
provides an important feedback for operators and decision-makers to dynamically 























































  Furthermore, when other potential accidents are identified and their associated 
hazard coordinates are estimated, the result is a portfolio of hazard coordinates, which 
roughly translates into “how hazardous is a particular situation” and “how much time is 
left before their corresponding accident occur”. This collective information can then be 
displayed dynamically in a hazard temporal contingency map (Fig. 3.9) to support 
operators’ sensemaking and help them prioritize attention and defensive resources for 
safety interventions and accident prevention9.  
 Figure 3.10 provides a graphical illustration of how the estimate for the time-to-
accident ΔTAi can be achieved in practice (shown here for two accidents A1 and A2). 
The plots represent the evolution in time of the quantity HAi – H(t), which reflects how 
far the current hazard level is from the level associated with each accident (normalized 
at 1 for simplicity and consistency with the similar feature discussed in the previous 
examples). The two panels in Figure 3.10 show the situation at two instants of time. 
The top and the bottom plots relate to two different hazard indices H1(t) and H2(t). At 
the beginning of the monitoring period (left panel), both indices indicate no hazardous 
condition developing (ΔTAi → ∞). At time t2, both hazard levels H1(t) and H2(t) 
escalate, the former faster than the latter (right panel). In this situation a simple 
estimation of the time to accidents for both indices informs the operators which 
sequence deserves more timely attention or immediate intervention (H1(t) in this case). 
The time-window available for safety interventions can be simply estimated according 
to Eq. (3.21):  
 
 ∆T! t! = t! − t! =  
!!!!(!!)
!(!!)
    (3.21) 
                                                
 
 
9 Trends over time and uncertainty bars in the estimates of both hazard coordinates can also be assessed 




 More elaborate estimators can be devised to account for the persistency of 
increase in H(t) as well as its slope and other dynamic features. Furthermore when the 
estimate is conducted repeatedly over time, a probability density function of ΔTAi can 
be obtained, thus reflecting the true nature of this time-to-accident metric as a random 
variable. Several uses can be made of this random variable and its features to inform 
safety-related decision-making, for example the shrinking of its standard deviation 
would reflect an increasing certainty of an impending accident (should business-as-
usual in the operation of the system be maintained, or no safety intervention triggered). 




Figure 3.10 Illustrative estimation of the time-to-accident for two hazard indices  
 
 The considerations presented in this section also allow for the identification of 



















time to emerging hazards and/or other mitigating actions, as advocated in [Mosleh, 
2014]. The effect of safety interventions directly translates into decreases in the hazard 
level, and hence new estimations of the time-to-accident metric (i.e., extension of ∆T!). 
Scenario-based testing can ensure that the safety features included in the system 
provide the operator with enough time to either trigger a safety intervention and abate 
the hazard level (i.e., block an accident from unfolding), or to mitigate its consequences 





TEMPORAL LOGIC SYNTAX AND PROPERTIES 
FORMULATION 
 
 This chapter introduces the Temporal Logic (TL) syntax and motivates the use 
of this formal language to bear on risk assessment and system safety issues. 
Furthermore, it presents in detail the formulation of TL safety properties, to be used in 
conjunction with the model-based hazard monitoring approach presented in chapter 3. 
The chapter is structured in the following way. Section 4.1 presents the high-level 
motivations for the adoption of TL. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the TL syntax 
and of the process for verifying safety properties. Section 4.3 introduces the safety 
properties that will be used for the case-study of chapter 5 and will serve as constraint 
for the system behavior. Section 4.4 presents their TL formulation.   
4.1 The Adoption of Temporal Logic 
 In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the use of temporal logic 
(TL) in a variety of technical areas, such as robotics and safety-critical computational 
system. TL provides a formal language for the verification of requirements and for 
specification logic, to ensure the desired performance and behavior of the overall 
system. An increasing number of applications have adopted it, including for example 
the expression of specifications for automated motion planning problems for a variety 
of vehicles such as ground-based robots, UAVs, and drones [Kress-Gazit et al., 2009], 
or the specifications of software program semantics capable of dynamically adapting to 
changing external conditions [Zhang and Cheng, 2006]. In robotics, temporal logic 
provides a convenient language for the expression of both usual control specifications 
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(e.g., reachability and stability analyses) as well as more complex time-dependent 
specifications (e.g., sequencing and obstacle avoidance), to express the behavior 
expected from the system [Fainekos et al., 2009]. Once a specification is provided in 
TL, checks and controls are implemented to ensure that such behavior is followed.  
 With the increasing demand of highly automated processes and systems, the 
reliance on the correct and safe functioning of embedded software components is 
growing rapidly [Baier and Katoen, 2008]. While computer science and software 
engineering heavily rely on the use of temporal logic, risk analysis and system safety 
speak a different (analytical) language. Probabilistic tools, Boolean logic and 
propositional calculus are well established in the risk and safety community (e.g., the 
use of Boolean logic in the gates of a fault tree or the use of predicate logic for 
probability calculations). By leveraging the TL formalism, a non-traditional choice for 
the risk analysis and system safety domain, the approach proposed offers novel 
capabilities, complementary to PRA, and rich possibilities for further contributions 
toward accident prevention and improved risk management. 
 There are several reasons that motivate the introduction of TL to bear on risk 
assessment and system safety issues. First, temporal logic makes use of “time 
operators” that allow expressing ideas of succession, change, and constancy over time, 
ideas central to risk analysis and to the notion of accident sequence, and that are 
implicitly included in most risk analysis tools. Temporal logic enables the explicit 
expression of these notions, translating the event-based path dependency (implicit in 
risk analysis) into time-based considerations. Second, temporal logic can serve as a 
bridge between the risk/safety community and the computer science community. 
Having a common formal language is likely to generate useful synergies between these 
two communities, and it can stimulate a useful in-depth dialog between them (beyond 
the current superficial modeling of software problems in Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment). Some authors have expressed concerns regarding the “still very much 
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hardware-orientated” character of risk analysis, advocating new models to account for 
this shift in the nature of processes [Mosleh, 2014]. Finally, the adoption of temporal 
logic also allows sharing the benefits of formal verification techniques (standard in 
computer science) for risk assessment. The potential for formal verification techniques, 
adapted to risk and safety applications, remains largely unexplored. With the increased 
development of software-intensive systems, there is a need to leverage automation to 
support risk assessment and management; the introduction of temporal logic for risk 
assessment and system safety can serve a useful purpose and a first step towards this 
aim.  
 In the proposed framework, TL is employed in conjunction with the tools 
presented in chapter 3, to augment the definition of the hazard level H(t) with the use of 
temporal operators, and to express constraint on the overall behavior of the system. In 
this chapter tackles this second ingredient in detail, while the integration with model-
based hazard monitoring is thoroughly examined in chapter 5.   
4.2 TL Syntax and its Use for Verification Purposes 
 Temporal logic (TL) is an extension of classical logic, which adds temporal 
modalities to the expression of a formula’s truth content (for the historical development 
of TL see [Galton, 1987]). TL adds operators that are related to time to the pool of 
operators from classical logic [Fisher, 2011]. Combined with standard propositional 
logic, TL provides a formal and precise language in which computational and 
dynamical properties of systems can be described and analyzed. The possibility to 
include a temporal dimension in a logical formula makes TL a good candidate to 
overcome some of the time-related limitations of traditional PRA highlighted by several 
authors [Zio, 2014; Mosleh, 2014; Favarò and Saleh, 2016a] and analyzed in chapter 2, 
and for the specification of key properties of systems whose behavior is time 
dependent, including software systems.  
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4.2.1 TL Temporal Operators 
 In addition to the operators of classical logic (e.g., Boolean operators “and	 ∧”, 
“or ∨”; the existence operator “∃ ”; the implication operator “→”), temporal logic 
makes use of operators that allow expressing ideas of succession, change, and/or 
constancy over time [Rescher and Urquhart, 1971]. Through the use of those temporal 
operators, TL allows the specification and the automatic verification of compliance 
with a broad range of important system properties that involved timing considerations 
such as ordering of events in a sequence and repetitiveness of events. The basic 
temporal operators of TL are presented in Table 4.1. Additional details on their 
definitions can be found in [Manna and Pnueli, 1992; Baier and Katoen, 2008; Fisher, 
2011]. 
Table 4.1 Temporal operators, based on [Fisher, 2011] 
 
Operator Description 
☐ (f) f   is true in all future instants of time 
◊ (f) f   is true at some point in the future 
Ο(f) f   is true in the next instant of time 
f U g f is true until g is true 
  f R g f releases g from being true 
 
 
 These basic operators can be extended with annotations allowing the expression 
of real-time constraints [Fisher, 2011]. For instance, the expression “ ◊>ti (f)” implies 
that f will be true at some point in the future after ti. Also, all the operators can be 
extended to be true for past times (instead of future ones), and are denoted by 
“blackening” the corresponding symbol (e.g., “!(f)” for always true in the past). Other 
operators or logical connectives used hereafter are described in Table 4.2.  
 The underlying nature of time in temporal logic can be either linear or 
branching. In the linear perspective, for each instant of time there is only one direct 
successor and one direct predecessor, whereas in the branching one time has a “tree-like 
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structure” where alternative future courses can be considered for each instant of time 
[Baier and Katoen, 2008]. 
 
Table 4.2 Logical connectives of classical logic 
 
Symbol Read as 
∃  There exists  
→  Implies 
 ∧,∨	  And, Or 
 ≜ Is defined as 
  ¬ Not 
 
 
 In this work linear temporal logic is employed, and it allows a simple 
perspective for the relative ordering of events (branching temporal logic is left as a 
fruitful venue for future work). Consider for instance two mutually exclusive events A 
and B that occur in a particular temporal order: first A and then B. This situation can be 
expressed by the TL formula “A∧Ο(B)” which is read as “at the present time A is true 
and in the next instant of time B is true” as represented in Figure 4.1. The real-time 




Figure 4.1 Representation of “A∧Ο(B)” 
  
 The TL formulae make use of a specific preference order for the logic operators: 
unary operators (those that require only one input argument, e.g., “O”) bind stronger 
than the binary ones (those that require two input arguments, e.g., “∧”). The 
parenthesis in the formula “A∧Ο(B)” can thus be omitted. For more complex cases, 
parentheses are used to ensure the correct understanding and execution of the formula.  
A" B" arbitrary" arbitrary"
A" O(B)" ?" ?"
A"""""O(B)"v"
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4.2.2 Verification of Properties Expressed in TL 
 TL provides an intuitive and mathematically precise notation for expressing 
properties that relate different system states at different times [Baier and Katoen, 2008]. 
In general, a TL formula can be intuitively thought of as providing one of the 
following: (i) a constraint on possible transitions between system states; (ii) a constraint 
on the set of states that can be accepted at the next instant of time; (iii) a description of 
system invariants, which are properties that should remain unchanged for the entire life 
of the system (e.g., many safety requirements that are expressed in the form “condition 
A never occurs” are considered invariants, as they describe a condition that should hold 




Figure 4.2 Schematic representation of the verification process  
  
 Two ingredients are needed for the verification process: the first is the 
translation in TL of a system requirement (for our purposes a safety requirement); the 
second is a model for the system under consideration. The verification effort aims at 


















achieved through direct monitoring of the system behavior or through formal 
verification techniques that involve mathematical abstraction (more details are included 
in chapter 6). The verification process is schematically represented in Figure 4.2. 
 Figure 4.2 shows that if the compliance check is not satisfied, changes in the 
system design, in the system operating procedures, and/or in the safety requirements 
should be considered. The violation of one or more properties provides an important 
feedback for the operators/designers in both off-line and on-line applications. If the 
verification/monitoring process is executed off-line, it can serve a useful purpose during 
the design and development stages of the system: violations of specific TL safety 
properties provide a useful feedback to designers and management to trigger changes in 
the current system design and layout of operating procedures. As it is analyzed in 
chapter 5, it is important to ensure that violations are discovered during the design 
stages on a system, to avoid serious consequences associated to the violation of the 
properties during operations. Should this be the case, the online verification can still 
provide a useful feedback to the operators to guide safety interventions. Detailed 
examples are provided in chapter 5.  
 The overall verification of TL properties in general helps assessing the 
effectiveness of measures taken to address various risks, and it supports the 
identification of measures that are not yet implemented in the system design and 
vulnerabilities in the system, towards improved accident prevention and risk mitigation 
strategies. 
 In this work, I examine a set of four safety principles, formulated at a high-level 
of abstraction, based on the notions of accident sequence and hazard level/escalation 
that was introduced in chapter 3. These safety properties, once expressed in TL, can be 
monitored during the design and operation of systems for compliance and be verified 
on-line and off-line, following the process previously outlined. The analytical definition 
of these properties is presented next, and afterwards their TL formulation is provided.    
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4.3 System Safety Principles 
 The introduction of system safety principles formulated at a high-level of 
abstraction can serve a useful role in safety engineering, in addition to the current tools 
of risk analysis and management. As presented next, system safety principles tackle 
safety issues from a perspective complementary to the one of risk analysis, and help 
overcome some limitations of current and well-established tools. This capability is then 
reflected in the role TL safety properties assume in the proposed framework, where 
they act as constraints on the system behavior. Their violation is indicative that the 
principle they stand for is not correctly implemented in the system, and provides and 
important feedback toward the re-engineering of safer systems. 
 Risk analysis has been described as addressing three main questions 
[Apostolakis, 2004; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981]: 
 
 (1) What can go wrong? 
 (2) How likely it is?  
 (3) What would be the consequences? 
 
 The end-objective of risk analysis is to help identify and prioritize risks, inform 
risk management, and support risk communication. These tools however do not provide 
design or operational guidelines or principles for eliminating or mitigating risks. Such 
considerations fall within the purview of system safety. To this end, a set of four safety 
principles is here proposed: the fail-safe principle; the safety margins principle; the 
defense-in-depth principle; the observability-in-depth principle. These principles are 
domain-independent, technologically agnostic, and broadly applicable across industries. 
They are presented in relation to both the classical notion of conditional probability, 
and the presented model of an accident sequence and the notion of hazard-level.  
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 The safety principles here examined provide guidelines and conceptual support 
during system design and operation for addressing the most important follow-up 
question, namely: 
 
 (4) What are you going to do about it [what can go wrong]? Or how are you 
going to defend against it? 
 
 For each property, a brief explanation is presented together with its analytical 
definition as published in [Saleh et al., 2014b; Favarò and Saleh, 2013; Favarò and 
Saleh, 2014; Favarò and Saleh, 2016b,c].  
4.3.1 The Fail-Safe Principle 
 The fail-safe (FS) principle imposes, or is defined by, one particular solution to 
the problem of how a local failure affects the system level hazard. The local failure of a 
system component (or disruption/termination of its function) can propagate and affect 
the system in different ways. For example it can lead to a cascading failure (domino 
effect), which would result in a complete system failure or accident (e.g., nodes in an 
electric power grids operating at maximum capacity). It can also remain confined to the 
neighborhood of the failed item and have a limited impact at the system level. 
 
   (4.1)  
  
e f :  failure of the item/function of interest at time tef
∂H
∂t
= 0   for t  >  tef
and









Specifically, the fail–safe principle requires that the failure of an item in a system or 
disruption/termination of its function should result in operational conditions that (i) 
block an accident sequence from further advancing, and/or (ii) freeze the dynamics of 
hazard escalation in the system, thus preventing potential harm or damage. The effects 
of the fail-safe principle can be expressed as indicated in Eq. (4.1).  
 Equation (4.1) expresses the fact that the dynamics of hazard escalation are 
frozen after the failure of the item/function, and the accident sequence is blocked (see 
Figure 4.3). Conversely, if the fail-safe principle is not implemented, the item’s failure, 
or termination of the function it performs, would aggravate a situation by further 
escalating its level of hazard, thus initiating an accident sequence or leading to an 
accident, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Illustrative comparison of system behavior over time following a local failure, both with the 
implementation of the FS principle and without it (tef is the time of occurrence of the failure of the 




































4.3.2 The Safety Margins Principle 
 The adoption of safety margins is a common practice in civil engineering where 
structures are designed with a safety factor to account for larger loads than what they 
are expected to sustain, or weaker structural strength than usual due to various 
uncertainties. The idea of safety margins in civil engineering is an instantiation of a 
broader safety principle, which is here referred to by the same name. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Illustration of the SM principle with a sample accident trajectory from a nominal operating 
condition to an accident. A larger margin makes it more likely that the system state will not reach the 
accident-triggering threshold, or that a longer time window is available to detect a system state that has 
crossed the operational upper limit (for nominal conditions) and abate the hazardous situation before an 
accident is triggered. 
 The safety margin principle has a simple form and is intuitively understood. It 
requires first an estimation of a critical hazard threshold for accident occurrence, 𝐻!"#$ 
(triggering threshold in Figure 4.4), and an understanding of the dynamics of hazard 
escalation in a particular situation. Secondly, the safety margin principle requires that 
features be put in place, including feedback loops (to the automation and/or to the 
operators) to maintain the operational conditions and the associated hazard level H(t) at 
some “distance” away from the estimated critical hazard threshold or accident-















   𝐻!"#$ − 𝐻(𝑡) ≥ 𝑆𝑀    (4.2a) 
 
or in relative terms: 
 
  !!"#$!! !
!!"#$
≥ 𝑆𝑀%              𝑜𝑟         𝐻(𝑡) ≤
!!"#$
!!!"%
   (4.2b) 
 
 Equation (4.2) is satisfied as an equality for a particular value of H(t) termed the 
hazard level corresponding to the “Operational Upper Limit” (OUL).  
 Note that in general, the hazard level is best modeled as a random variable. 
There are uncertainties associated with both the estimation of its value and with the 
definition of critical thresholds in the first place. Safety margins are one way for coping 
with uncertainties in both the critical hazard threshold and in our ability to manage the 
operational conditions in a system such that their associated hazard level H(t) does not 
intersect with the real but unknown.  
4.3.3 The Defense-in-Depth Principle 
 Defense-in-depth (DID) derives from a long tradition in warfare by virtue of 
which important positions were protected by multiple lines of defenses (e.g., moat, 
outer wall, inner wall). First conceptualized in the nuclear industry, defense-in-depth 
became the basis for risk-informed decisions by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission [NRC, 2000; Sørensen et al., 1999-2000], and it is adopted under various 
names in other industries. Defense-in-depth has several pillars: 
 
i. Multiple lines of defenses or safety barriers should be placed along potential 
accident sequences; 
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ii. Safety should not rely on a single defensive element (hence the “depth” 
qualifier in defense-in-depth) and the successive barriers should be diverse in 
nature, and include technical, operational, and organizational safety barriers. 
In other words, defense-in-depth should not be conceived of as implemented 
only through physical defenses. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Illustration of the DID principle, along with a hypothetical accident sequence (its occurrence 
is the result of the absence, inadequacy, or breach of various safety barriers) 
 Figure 4.5 provides a schematic illustration of this safety principle, along with a 
particular accident sequence. 
 The various safety barriers have different objectives and perform different 
functions. The first set of barriers, or line of defense, is meant to prevent an accident 
sequence from initiating. The first line of defense implies that safety features are 
devised and put in place such that the probability of an accident-initiating event (IE) is 
minimized: 
 























min p IEi( )!" #$
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 Should this first line of defense fail in its prevention function, a second set of 
safety defenses should be in place to block the accident sequence from further 
escalating:  
 
     (4.4)               
 
 Finally should the first and second lines of defense fail, a third set of safety 
defenses should be in place to contain the accident and mitigate its consequences. 
This third line of defense is designed and put in place based on the assumption that the 
accident will occur, but its potential adverse consequences (PAC) should be 
minimized10. The objective of the third line of defense can be expressed as follows: 
 
      (4.5)                                                                                                         
 
These three lines of defenses constitute defense-in-depth and its three functions, namely 
(i) prevention, (ii) blocking further hazardous escalation, and (ii) containing the damage 
or mitigating the potential consequences. Notice that all else being equal, the hazard 
level scales with the extent of PAC. A minimization of PAC implies then hazard de-
escalation.  
 
                                                
 
 
10 The potential adverse consequences are a function of both the amount of energy involved or being 
handled in a system, and the extent of vulnerable resources in its neighborhood (people and structures). 
For example, a chemical plant in the middle of a densely populated city has a higher potential for adverse 
consequences than if it were sited in a remote industrial zone. 
min p ei+k | ei( )!" #$        ∀i,k      for     ei ∈ s    and    ei+k ∈ s    following ei
min PAC | A( )
 69 
4.3.4 The Observability-in-Depth Principle  
 Despite its general appeal, defense-in-depth is not without its drawbacks, which 
include its potential for concealing the occurrence of hazardous states in a system, and 
more generally rendering the latter more opaque for its operators and managers, thus 
resulting in safety blind spots. This in turn translates into a shrinking of the time 
window available for operators to identify an unfolding hazardous condition or situation 
and intervene to abate it. To prevent this drawback from materializing, I proposed in 
[Favarò and Saleh, 2013; Favarò and Saleh, 2014] a novel safety principle termed 
“observability-in-depth” (OID). It is characterized as the set of provisions technical, 
operational, and organizational designed to enable the monitoring and identification of 
emerging hazardous conditions and accident pathogens in real-time and over different 
time-scales. Observability-in-depth also requires the monitoring of conditions of all 
safety barriers that implement defense-in-depth; and in so doing it supports 
sensemaking of identified hazardous conditions, and the understanding of potential 
accident sequences that might follow (how they can propagate). Observability-in-depth 
is thus an information-centric principle, and its importance in accident prevention is in 
the value of the information it provides and actions or safety interventions it spurs11. 
 To visually illustrate this argument, consider the situation represented in Figure 
4.6. This is similar to the dynamics of hazard level and accident sequence represented 
                                                
 
 
11 While there are similarities with the notion of “observability” and “diagnosability” from Control 
Theory, observability-in-depth represents a broader concept that accounts also for the establishment of an 
observer. Additionally, observability-in-depth includes an important aspect of predicting the propagation 
of current states in the future to assess potential accident sequences that might follow from specific 
actions (and is hence prospective in nature, while Control Theory observability can be thought of being 
quasi-retrospective). Finally, observability-in-depth requires the direct scanning and monitoring of 
accident pathogens, which by definition have no visible effect on the system’s output under nominal 
operating conditions, and as such they are not observable in a control theoretic sense [Favarò & Saleh, 
2014]. 
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previously in chapter 3, except for the distinction between the actual hazard level, H(t), 
and the estimated or assumed hazard level, 𝐻(𝑡). 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Hazard escalation over time and violation of the OID principle. The figure shows how 
underestimating the actual hazard level (ovals) can lead to an accident occurring seemingly without 
warning (rectangles). 
 Roughly speaking, operators make decisions during system operation, which are 
based on and affect the hazard level in a system. If the system conditions/states are not 
carefully monitored and reliably reported, there is a distinct possibility that the hazard 
level estimated by the operators will diverge from the actual hazard level reached by 
the system, as indicated in Eq. (4.6). 
 
     (4.6) 
 
The gap between these two quantities can result in the operators making flawed 
decisions, which in turn can compromise the safe operation of the system or fail to 
check the escalation of an accident sequence (e.g., no action when an intervention is 




















ΔH ≡ Ĥ −H t( )
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seeks (i) to minimize the gap between the actual and the estimated hazard levels, and 
(ii) to ensure that at the hazard levels associated with the breaching of various safety 
barriers (e.g. triggering of alarms and warnings at t1, t2, and t3 in Figure 4.6), the two 
values (actual and estimated) coincide. This concept can be expressed as follows: 
 
    (4.7) 
 
4.4 TL Formulation of the Safety Properties 
 Figure 4.2 presented the high-level view of the steps that are needed for the 
execution of the verification process. Chapter 3 tackled the development of the system 
model, the left side of Figure 4.2. The previous section presented the safety property the 
system should satisfy in a descriptive way, together with an analytical definition based 
on the notion of the hazard level (and in some cases, its counter-part in terms of 
conditional probabilities). The next step of the process is thus the translation of the 
safety properties in the language of TL.  
 In this subsection, the logical operators presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are 
employed for the translation of the elements defined in Eqs. (4.1-4.7) in the language of 
TL. Equations (4.8-4.11) provide the TL formulae describing the safety properties 
introduced in the previous section. For each TL formula a detailed explanation of how 
to read and interpret the syntax is provided. Each of the TL formulae presented next 
constitute a constraint on the system behavior. Once a model for the system is obtained, 
these requirements are checked and controlled for compliance/satisfaction according to 
ebi :  breach of safety barrier bi
minΔH  ⇔  min Ĥ −H t( )
and








the process show in Figure 4.2. The formulation of each TL formula is predicated on 
the hazard level function H(t). Note that multiple hazard level functions can be used for 
the properties definition (different hazard level function for each principle). I will 
revisit this point in chapter 5 with detailed examples.  
4.4.1 The Fail-Safe TL Property  
 The fail-safe principle revolves around the notion of an accident-triggering 
threshold (with corresponding hazard level Hcrit). It is then fundamental for the correct 
implementation of the principle that a local failure event (ef in Eq. (4.8)) does not 
induce a breaching of such threshold and that the hazard level dynamics is not an 
escalating one.  
 
           FS   ≜ {  e! t = t!" → [☐ 𝐻 𝑡 < 𝐻!"#$ ∧ ☐t>tef ¬
!"
!"
> 0]   (4.8) 
 
 Equation (4.8) reads: “If the local (component) failure event ef occurs at time tef, 
then the hazard level is always less than the critical level and for all instants of time 
following tef the hazard level does not escalate”. As previously noted, Eq. (4.8) provides 
a quantifiable constraint that can be formally verified for compliance during system 
operations or during the design stages. The translation of a qualitative/descriptive safety 
principle into a quantitative definition is the fundamental step that allows the 
verification process of Figure 4.2. The violation of a safety principle like the one 
expressed in Eq. (4.8) provides useful insight towards several ends. Firstly, when 
different hazard level functions are used for each safety principle, the violation of a 
specific TL formula tells the operator which hazard level to monitor more closely (for 
complex systems several hazard level are monitored at each time). Mapping the specific 
hazard level of interest into a diagram such as the hazard-temporal contingency map of 
chapter 3 supports the on-line management, ranking, and recognition of the need for 
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safety interventions. Additionally, the specific principle violated provides an important 
feedback for off-line considerations as well. For instance, if Eq. (4.8) is violated, this 
means that for that specific hazard the fail-safe principle was not correctly 
implemented. Changes in the layout of the available safety barriers, in the system 
design, and in the operating procedures can be put in place to overcome the lack of 
compliance identified by the TL formula violation. A detailed example of such 
violation and the re-design shrewdness needed to overcome it are presented in the case 
study of chapter 5.  
4.4.2 The Safety Margins TL Property  
 Central to the definition of the safety margins principle is a minimum required 
time T that ensures that a good time-window for operators’ intervention can be 
established in between the time at which the operational upper limit is met and the time 
at which the accident triggering threshold is reached. The TL property related to this 
principle is defined in Eq. (4.9). 
 
  SM   ≜ {  𝐻!"# 𝑡 = 𝑡! → [  ∃  T: ☐t<t1+T 𝐻 𝑡 < 𝐻!"#$ ]}        (4.9) 
 
 Equation (4.9) reads: “If the operational upper limit is reached at time t1 then 
there exists a time T such that for all instants of time before t1+T the critical hazard 
level is not reached”. To set up a proper safety margin it is necessary thus to ensure 
time T is greater or equal to a pre-specified time-window needed for safety 
interventions. A corollary of Eq. (4.9) is hence the need to embed in the system features 
that “slow down” the hazard escalation process, to buy the operators more time for 
safety interventions before an accident unfolds. As noted previously in regards to the 
fail-safe property, changes in the system design and in the barriers layout (including 
alarms and warning systems to indicate that the operational upper limit has been met) 
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can be considered to ensure compliance with Eq. (4.9). Equation (4.9) is not directly 
implemented in the case study of chapter 5. This is because it can be subsumed under 
the following property of defense-in-depth. The definition of various criticality 
thresholds for the hazard level H(t) allows to account for safety margins inside their 
definition. This is the case, for instance, of the fact that the critical threshold Hcrit never 
corresponds to the accident occurrence threshold HA. Setting barriers and subsequent 
warnings in between these thresholds already accounts for the safety margins principle.   
4.4.3 The Defense-in-Depth TL Property  
 Three lines of defenses embody the functions of defense-in-depth. In the 
proposed model-based framework their quantification is straightforward and relates to 
the breaching of critical thresholds of H(t) and to the prevention or blocking of hazard 
escalation dynamics.  These functions are represented in Eq. (4.10). 
 
PR     ≜ { ☐ 𝐻 𝑡 < 𝐻!"#$ }         (4.10a) 
BL      ≜ {  ♦ 𝐻 𝑡 = 𝐻!"#$ → [◊ 
!"
!"
≤ 0   ∧ ☐+ 𝐻 𝑡 < 𝐻! ]} 12  (4.10b) 
MIT  ≜ {  ♦ 𝐻 𝑡 = 𝐻! → [PAC|! < max  (PAC)]}    (4.10c)  
 
 Equation (4.10a) reads as follows: “The hazard level is always less than the 
critical threshold”. This condition ensures that prevention barriers are put in place to 
maintain the system within its safe operating conditions. When this condition is 
violated, Equation (4.10b) picks up the slack with the blocking function; it assumes that 
the first line of defense has been breached and the accident-triggering threshold has 
been reached. It reads as follows:  “If at some point in the past the critical threshold is 
reached, then it follows that at some point in the future the hazard level dynamics is 
                                                
 
 
12 In Eq. (15b) the operator ☐+ indicates all future instants of time. 
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frozen or it de-escalates, and that for all future instants of time the accident hazard 
level is not reached”. The same considerations apply to Eq. (4.10c) formalizing the last 
line of defenses, those that embody the mitigation function. Equation (4.10c) reads as 
follows:  “If at some point in the past the hazard level associated with the accident 
unfolding is met, then the potential adverse consequences associated with the accident 
release are less than those of the worst-case scenario”. The final function of DID is not 
directly related to hazard level dynamics, and an extensive body of work is available in 
the literature on methodologies for the quantification of the potential consequences 
associated to an accident and their ranking. The case study of chapter 5 will only verify 
and examine the first two lines of defenses, with the focus of preventing the accident 
from unfolding.  
4.4.4 The Observability-in-Depth TL Property  
 The OID property is meant to eliminate the potential for safety blind spots—the 
concealment of hazardous states or event occurrence—in system design and operation, 
in support of operators’ situational awareness. The sensemaking of increasingly critical 
conditions is related in the proposed framework to the quantification of the hazard 
level. Among other things this principle requires then that a correct estimation of the 
hazard level is achieved, and that the breaching of subsequent barriers supports and 
informs such estimation. The “correctness” of the estimation process is expressed in 
terms of the discrepancy between two evaluations of the hazard level H(t). In simple 
terms, one evaluation is considered to correspond to the actual conditions of the system, 
and the other to the operator’s estimation of those conditions (more details in chapter 
5). The TL constraints for observability-in-depth are expressed in Eq. (4.11a) and 
(4.11b). 
 
OID1 ≜ { ☐¬ 𝐻 𝑡 −   𝐻(𝑡) > ε }     (4.11a)    
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    OID2 ≜ { ☐[e!! t = t! →
! ! ! !  ! !
!"
< 0]}                                (4.11b) 
 
 Equation (4.11a) reads: “The actual and the estimated hazard level never differ 
from each other of more than an admissible pre-set tolerance ε”. The second ingredient 
to the OID principle derives from the feedback provided by safety barriers that are 
breached during the dynamics of hazard escalation. Equation (4.7) required a zero gap 
between the actual and the estimated hazard level after each barrier breaching. As this 
may not always be realistic (for instance due to the transients in change in the hazard 
level functions), this consideration is relaxed in Eq. (4.11b), which reads as follows: “If 
a defense barrier is breached at time ti, it follows that the discrepancy between the 
actual and the estimated hazard level decreases”. Violations of the OID property will 
have a fundamental role in the escalation of the accident sequence of the Learjet 
overrun analyzed in chapter 5 and are therein analyzed in detail.  
 
 The formalization of the safety principles through the TL syntax supports the 
real-time monitoring of emerging risks and the identification of potential vulnerabilities 
and deficiencies in risk managements strategies. TL safety properties act as constraints 
on the system behavior and are continuously checked and verified for correctness in 
real-time. Violations of the safety properties indicate that the principles they stand for 
are not correctly implemented in the system, and provide an important feedback for 
both designers/analysts and operators/technicians to guide safety interventions. These 
capabilities are carefully explored in the next chapter, with the presentation of a real-
life case study. Finally, the TL syntax provides tools for the formal specification of the 
safety principles in a design process and can support the automatization of the 
verification process. As previously mentioned, the introduction of temporal logic for 
safety purposes creates a bridge between the risk community and the language adopted 
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for the automated specification of requirements in the software community. Providing 
common semantics across the two is a fundamental step to ensure the integration of 





INTEGRATING TL AND MODEL-BASED HAZARD 
MONITORING 
 
 The objective of this chapter is to integrate TL and the material presented in 
chapter 4 with the safety supervisory framework of chapter 3 on the one hand, and to 
demonstrate the practical application of the integrated framework and the novel insights 
it can provide for improved risk assessment and accident prevention on the other hand. 
The chapter is structured in the following way. Section 5.1 presents a high-level 
introduction on the uses of TL in support of the safety supervisory control framework. 
Section 5.2 examines a real-life case study used as “proof-of-concept” for the integrated 
framework. Section 5.3 analyzes the use of the material from chapter 4 in support of the 
case study and summarizes the particular insights that it enabled to derive.  
5.1 TL in Support of the Safety Supervisory Control Framework 
 As explained in chapter 4, TL has been traditionally employed as a specification 
language for systems whose behavior is time-dependent (e.g., to describe the sequence 
of states taken up by a traffic light: first red, then green, then orange). In this work, TL 
is employed in the following ways: 1) to model and include temporal considerations in 
the analytical definition of the hazard level H(t); 2) to model the behavior of software 
and digital components in the simulation environment; 3) to model safety properties 
and constraint for the system. Details on the advantages deriving from each use follow 
next. The use of TL for the analytic definition of the hazard level provides two 
advantages. First, it allows more complex expressions of H(t) that include temporal 
operators (examples are presented in the case study of Section 5.2). Explicit 
considerations of ordering and timing of events, faults, or sequence of states can be 
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included in the definition of H(t) itself. This provides significant benefits for expressing 
complex conditions or situations in a compact form (and readily 
testable/operationalizable), as is frequently done in software code for example, and that 
is exceedingly difficult to render based on state variables alone. The direct inclusion of 
temporal operators in the definition of the hazard level can be viewed as a state 
augmentation operation, where the state vector of the system is expanded to also 
account for past (and or future) states and state transitions (or states within a slice of 
time when other conditions are present). The richness of this expressive capability 
cannot be overstated. The use of TL in the definition of H(t) can also alleviate problems 
when the entire state of the system is not available and or not modeled in the state 
equation. For example, the use of TL can readily capture state transitions when they are 
needed in the definition of hazard levels (e.g., past values of a subset of the state 
variables and their comparison with the current values) without resorting to the 
dynamics of the entire system, thus bypassing the use of the state equation. In other 
words, TL allows to re-introduce a richness in the problem analysis that may have been 
originally lost by accounting for a reduced set of state variables in the system model. 
For instance, in Section 5.2 I will define a hazard level based on the history of the squat 
switch state (a sensor used to indicate whether an aircraft is on the ground or in the air) 
without accounting or developing a state equation for this specific state.  
 TL is also employed in the proposed framework for the specification of software 
and digital components behavior (modeled in Simulink through State Charts). This use 
closely follows what is traditionally done in the robotics and computer science. By 
leveraging a language that is typical of software systems, the proposed approach allows 
the integration of both software and hardware components within the same framework. 
As such, temporal logic can serve as a bridge between the risk/safety community and 
the computer science community. As previously noted in chapter 4, having a common 
formal language is likely to generate useful synergies between these two communities, 
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and it can stimulate a useful in-depth dialog between them. The adoption of TL can also 
help reduce miscommunications occurring at the interface between the two engineering 
disciplines of risk/safety and software engineering [Hansen et al. 1998], and it can 
provide a common semantic model for terms used in safety analysis and in software 
requirements. Such a common model is important whenever engineers from multiple 
disciplines need to work together, which is the case for all modern cyber-physical 
systems that heavily rely on the integration of software and hardware for system design 
and process control. This would also work towards satisfying the need of traceability 
between software requirements and system requirements, as discussed in [NUREG, 
1995, 1996]. 
 Finally, TL is employed for the expression of safety properties and constraints 
for the system, as presented in detail in chapter 4. The use of temporal logic enables to 
express more complex constraints than the one of Eq. (3.16), and allows to leverage 
formal verifications techniques (standard in computer science) for automatic safety 
requirements validation.  
 Before presenting the case study and the detailed application of the framework, I 
briefly expand on this final use. 
 In general, safety properties specified in temporal logic take up the following 
form [Baier and Katoen, 2008; Hansen et al., 1998]: 
 
                ☐¬A       (5.1) 
 
where A represents the occurrence of an accident or adverse event, and hence the 
expression reads: “accident A never occurs”. In [Hansen et al., 1998], the accident A is 
set as the top event in a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and then it is decomposed into 
lower level events and assembled using logic gates augmented with temporal operators. 
Gates in FTA allow or prevent the fault logic to propagate up the fault tree, from basic 
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events (e.g., at a component level, typically not further decomposable) toward the 
system-level top event. One important synergy emerges at this point from the 
integration of the previous model-based hazard modeling/monitoring with TL, which 
allows combining the format of Eq. (5.1) with the simple constraint provided in Eq. 
(3.16) into the quantifiable form  
 
☐ 𝐻 𝑡 < 𝐻!      (5.2) 
 
where HA represents the hazard level associated with the accident occurrence and reads: 
“The hazard level is always less than the threshold corresponding to the accident 
occurrence”. Equation (5.2) represents the general requirement for the system to always 
remain within safety bounds of operation (with respect to accident A). When comparing 
Eq. (5.2) with the TL properties presented in chapter 4, it is intuitive to understand how 
Eq. (5.2) serves as building block for the devising of more complex constraints for the 
behavior of the system. Each TL property is predicated on a particular hazard level 
H(t), and at the same time can inform the analytical definition of the specific danger 
index (e.g., if the system is required to abide by the fail-safe principle, a choice of H(t) 
may be more suitable than another, in a process similar to the one by which the 
designer/analyst chooses which state variables to pick for the state-space representation 
of a system).   
 Note that TL safety properties’ expressions are independent of the specific 
hazards functions H(t) of interest. That is, the same TL property can be used for a wide 
range of H(t), which are developed for a specific accident and within a particular 
system. Said differently, the hazard functions are specialized and tailored to particular 
contexts, whereas the TL safety properties are general and agnostic to the underlying 
system. They can be conceived of as elements within a broad library of safety 
properties to be adapted and applied for the analysis of different dynamical systems. 
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Applications and insights derived from the specific TL safety properties analyzed in 
chapter 4 and the specific hazard functions are provided in Section 5.2. 
  In the proposed framework, TL safety properties are continuously 
checked/verified for compliance. By leveraging a formal language, this approach allows 
the automatic generation of warning signs (e.g., the display of error messages) 
whenever constraints are violated, or whenever critical thresholds for H(t) are about to 
be (b)reached. This is an important capability for their online use, to support the 
operator’s situational awareness and sensemaking of the system conditions and the 
timely execution of safety interventions. Their violation is a clear indication that the 
principle they stand for is not correctly implemented in the system, and raise concerns 
on the effectiveness of the safety measures embedded in the system. When applied off-
line, this diagnostic information provides important guidelines in support of the design 
of additional safety features and system re-engineering, as it is showcased by the case 
study presented next. 
5.2 Application of the Integrated Framework and Case Study 
 This section presents an analysis of a recent aircraft accident, examined within 
the integrated framework previously discussed. The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate the practical implementation of the integrated safety supervisory control 
framework, and to illustrate some of the insights that can be obtained from TL and 
model-based hazard modeling/monitoring. In addition, within the specific context of the 
case study, I identify one important flaw in the logic that allows the Full Authority 
Digital Engine Control (FADEC), not identified during the accident investigation, and 
recommend a solution for addressing it  (which should be considered and carefully 
assessed by aircraft manufactures for safer takeoffs).  
 The section is structured as follows: 5.2.1 provides the accident narrative; 5.2.2 
presents the analytical and numerical model development; finally, 5.2.3 delves into the 
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identification and monitoring of the hazard levels informed by the specific constraints 
and their verification of compliance. 
5.2.1 Accident Narrative 
 The selected case study involves a runway overrun by a Bombardier Learjet 60. 
The overrun occurred during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport, 
South Carolina on September 19, 2008, and resulted in the death of the two pilots and 
two of the four passengers, as well as total loss of the aircraft and substantial damage to 
the airport property [NTSB, 2010]. This section provides the salient details that are 
necessary to understand the analysis of the hazard monitoring process and the 
verification of the TL safety principles. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Learjet 60 runway overrun STEP diagram 
 Figure 5.1 shows a simplified visualization of the accident sequence through the 
use of a STEP (Sequential Timed Events Plotting) diagram [Favarò et al., 2013]. The 
diagram is structured as a matrix, with each row representing the actions or events 






























executed by physical agents are indicated in rectangles, and ovals are used for software 
contributions to the sequence of events. The agents are indicated in the first column or 
y-axis, and the timeline is represented on the x-axis.   
 As shown in the STEP diagram, the accident sequence started when the pilots 
initiated the takeoff roll, around 23:54 EDT. The aircraft reached a speed of 136 NM/hr 
(V1 speed) before the initiating event of the accident occurred. About 30 seconds into 
the takeoff, the tires on the main landing gear (MLG) disintegrated due to insufficient 
inflation, and the pilots decided to abort the takeoff. The thrust reversers (TR) were 
then activated using the cockpit TR lever to help slow down the aircraft. At this point 
an important role was played by a flawed logic in the Full Authority Digital Engine 
Control (FADEC), causing a hazardous situation to become unrecoverable and leading 
to the accident. In order to allow the deployment of the thrust reversers, the FADEC 
subsystem required the presence of signals coming from several sources, including the 
squat switches of the main landing gear. The squat switches are sensors that signal 
when an airplane is on the ground. The “GROUND mode” signal is received upon 
sensing that the MLG is appropriately compressed to support the plane’s weight 
[NTSB, 2010]. The FADEC would not allow the deployment of the thrust reversers 
unless the squat switches on the MLG positively indicated that the landing gear was 
indeed on the ground13. The squat sensors of the Learjet had been damaged during the 
tires’ explosion, and the absence of signal from the switches (no compression of the 
MLG could be sensed) was positively interpreted by the FADEC as the aircraft being in 
“AIR mode” (i.e., not on the ground). This flawed deduction was a critical factor in the 
occurrence of the accident since the distinction between “AIR Mode” and “GROUND 
                                                
 
 
13 This requirement was in place to prevent other dangerous situations, such as the unintentional 
deployment on TR while the aircraft was in flight.  
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Mode” enabled or disallowed many of the inputs available to the pilots to de-escalate 
the hazardous sequence of events, as presented next14.  
 Not only did the FADEC override the pilot’s request of the thrust reverser, it 
also shifted to a forward power schedule proper for the air mode. Subsequently it 
increased the thrust in accordance with the throttle value that the engines were set to by 
the pilot (though the pilot did so in backward schedule as the cockpit TR levers were 
engaged for TR deployment). This throttle value was increased in proportion to the 
maximum thrust reversing level called for by the pilots. As a result of the FADEC 
logic, the engines produced a high level thrust and the aircraft further accelerated. After 
noticing that the aircraft was still accelerating, the pilots eventually turned off the thrust 
reversers, seconds before overrunning the runway and striking a concrete highway 
marker post. The aircraft then went on crossing a five-lane road, and striking an 
embankment on the far side of the road, then exploding in a fireball. 
5.2.2 State-Space Representation and Simulink Model 
 This section provides the model for the system during the accident sequence up 
to the first collision of the aircraft beyond the end of the runway (first 51 seconds of the 
accident sequence).  
 Figure 5.2 provides a screenshot of the Simulink model developed for the case 
study. The upper left portion and the central portion represent the dynamics of the 
system (which follows the one presented in chapter 3 and is briefly reviewed next), 
                                                
 
 
14 It is interesting to note that despite its importance to the accident, the FADEC logic was not examined 
in detail during the accident investigation and no recommendations were issued to improve on it. This is 
an unfortunate missed learning opportunity, and we have argued in [Foreman et al., 2015] for the need to 
involve software engineers in aircraft accident investigations and to dedicate a section to software 
contributions to the accident.  
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while the grey boxes around the edges contain the verification blocks for the TL safety 
constraints discussed in the next subsection.   
 
 
Figure 5.2 Screenshot of the Simulink model of the aircraft and FADEC at takeoff  
 The aircraft dynamics is treated along the x-axis (along the runway) as done in 
chapter 3. No lateral dynamics are examined since the NTSB accident investigation 
report showed that the aircraft had no relevant side movement up to the point of the first 
collision. The governing differential equation, which will be next translated into the 





= T− D−   µμ! W− L     (5.3) 
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m is the vehicle mass (estimated for that day at 10,800 kg); T is the thrust provided by 
the engines (this is an input to the model, as discussed in detail next); D is the drag, and 
it is dependent on the aircraft configuration and the velocity !"
!"
; µμ! is the rolling friction 
coefficient, which depends on whether brakes are applied or not (much higher when 
brakes are applied), and among other factors on the tires condition (after the MLG 
damage its value is significantly reduced); W is the aircraft weight; L is the lift, and just 
like drag it is dependent on the aircraft configuration and the velocity15.  
 As noted previously, the thrust value T is an input to the model. Other inputs 
include the position of the TR lever from the cockpit, and a binary choice for the tire 
brakes (applied or not applied by the pilot). The value of the thrust (as set by the thrust 
lever in the cockpit) is provided for the first 51 seconds of the sequence in the NTSB 
report as a percentage of the maximum available power (Tmax = 20,400 N for each of 
the two engines).  
 The specification of the model’s inputs makes this a scenario-based case study. 
This choice was made to render the present application of the framework and the results 
more understandable (without the added complexity of auto-generating test cases). The 
Simulink toolbox Design Verifier also allows the automated generation of test cases for 
different values of the inputs, carefully designed to ensure that all the possible 
combinations and settings of the model are adequately tested. Additionally, the 
framework is capable of handling multiple scenarios at a time, in case the user still opts 
                                                
 
 
15 Here are some of the basics assumptions for the computation of drag and lift: the maximum lift coefficient 
CL is considered 1.25; the zero-lift drag coefficient CD0 is considered constant throughout the takeoff 
procedure with a value of 0.025; lift-induced drag is estimated using an Oswald efficiency factor of 0.71 





! with b span of the aircraft and h the height of the wing from the ground.  
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for postulated scenarios simulation, rather than the automatic generation of the input 
values provided by Design Verifier. This point will be revisited in chapter 6.   
 Choosing the first state x1 as the distance traveled along the runway, and the 
second state x2 as the velocity, Eq. (5.3) can be translated into the state-space equations: 
 
x! t = x! t                                                                                         
x!(t) =   
! ! !! !!(!) !  !! ! (  !!! !!(!) )
!
    (5.4) 
 
where the dependency on time and on velocity have been explicitly shown for each 
factor. 
 Figure 5.3 shows a closer look of the dynamical system model. To better 
illustrate one of the points of the analysis that follows, I duplicate the model Eq. (5.4) 
and record the system behavior corresponding to two different input settings as 
explained next. The system structure of Figure 5.3 is divided into two parts and leading 
to two sets of outputs: a part that uses the pilot’s cockpit input settings (on the left), and 
one part that uses the FADEC settings (on the right, which is modeled through the use 
of a State Chart). I will refer to these as the unfiltered (pilot) and filtered (FADEC) 
settings. This split allows to identify discrepancies, when they emerge, between the 
pilot’s settings and how the FADEC executes or overrides them. Although this 
duplication is a minor detail in the present work, I believe it is rich in possibilities for 
testing software in cyber-physical systems and revealing deficiencies and automation 
flaws. 
 The inputs previously discussed are fed to both parts. However, the FADEC 
subsystem acts on the additional input provided by the state indication from the squat 




Figure 5.3 Dynamical system model  
 The choice to examine a “split model” with inputs from two different nodes in 
the system decision-making chain (in this case, the pilot followed by the FADEC) lends 
itself to a sort of dichotomy in the output, which is examined hereafter. On the one 
hand, the left side of Figure 5.3 results in the output that would be obtained if the 
system were indeed using the inputs provided by the pilots in the cockpit (reflecting the 
pilot’s intent). On the other hand, the right side of Figure 5.3 results in the output that 
was actually obtained, with the aircraft executing inputs provided by the FADEC. 
 A potential discrepancy in the results coming from the two parts of the system 
raises concerns about a possible degraded authority and situational awareness of the 
pilots (and hence to correctly act on de-escalating or mitigating a hazardous situation). 
This point is examined in detail in conjunction with the analysis of the observability-in-
depth TL property in subsection 5.2.3. Both parts use the same model for the system 
dynamics provided by Eq. (5.4), and whose integration structure is contained in the two 
“Dynamical Model” grey boxes of Figure 5.3.  
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 The system outputs in this case are given by the distance, velocity, and 
acceleration of the aircraft. As noted earlier, the model for the present analysis provides 
two sets of outputs: those coming from the “unfiltered” cockpit inputs (i.e., exactly the 
settings set up by the pilots in the cockpit) and those coming from the “FADEC 
filtered” input settings. The model expressed in Eq. (5.4) and shown in Figure 5.3 was 
validated by comparing the reconstructed distance, speed and acceleration (actual 
values as executed by the FADEC subsystem) with the values provided in [NTSB, 
2010].  
5.2.3 Hazard Monitoring and TL Safety Properties Verification 
 Following the Learjet 60 accident in 2008, the national transportation safety 
board (NTSB) launched an official investigation. The ensuing report in 2010 
highlighted and focused on the role that the explosion of the under-inflated tires had in 
initiating the accident sequence. Furthermore, it issued recommendations to the FAA 
and aircraft manufacturers for improving maintenance and inspection schedules.  
 The considerations included in the official report have an important role, which 
is here recognized, as they work towards the removal of the immediate cause of the 
accident, or in other words, in preventing the initiating event. At the same time though, 
it is equally important to assess the role of the factors that allowed the escalation of 
adverse conditions (with the dire consequences associated with them) and that failed to 
better inform the pilots at important decision-making nodes during the accident 
sequence. The upcoming analysis revolves around these considerations, and tackles 
them by examining three important questions, namely: 
 
i. Was it possible to prevent the FADEC from wrongly estimating that the 
aircraft was in AIR mode (thus allowing the use of thrust reversers by the 
pilots)? 
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ii. Was it safe for the pilots to initiate a rejected takeoff (RTO), and if not, how 
could they have been made aware of the danger? 
iii. Was it possible to warn the pilots that the inputs they selected in the cockpit 
were not being executed? 
 
 The careful examination of these questions in conjunction with the verification 
of the TL safety properties sheds light on blind spots in the analysis that guided both the 
investigation and the drafting of recommendations to prevent similar occurrences in the 
future. I present next the definition of several hazard indices informed by specific TL 
safety properties to provide an answer to each of these questions.  
   
i. Was it possible to prevent the FADEC from wrongly estimating that the 
aircraft was in AIR mode (thus allowing the use of thrust reversers by the 
pilots)? 
 
 As noted previously, the explosion of the tires of the main landing gear (MLG) 
damaged the squat switches, whose indication provided an important input to the 
FADEC subsystem for discerning whether the aircraft was in GROUND or AIR mode. 
The no-signal from the damaged switches was interpreted as a signal of zero 
compression of the landing gear, which resulted in the FADEC estimating that the 
aircraft was in AIR mode. 
 The answer to the first question revolves then around the possibility of including 
a check that even for the condition of the case study (i.e., damaged switch treated as 
zero input) would ensure that the FADEC would not estimate the aircraft to be in AIR 
mode when it actually is still on the ground. In order to develop such check, which I 
will impose as a constraint on the system, the fail-safe principle is considered: the 
correct implementation of this principle ensures that a local failure does not lead to a 
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system-level failure. In this case I will consider the role played in the accident sequence 
by the failure of the squat switches on the MLG. Specifically, the local failure event is 
the tire explosion 30 seconds into the takeoff that led to the missing compression-signal 
from the switch. To set up the analytical definition of a hazard index, the first thing is to 
determine what condition would define a violation of the constraint of interest (in this 
case the TL expression of the fail-safe principle), and hence constitute a breach of 
property (4.8). This can be achieved in a number of ways. Temporal ordering plays a 
central role in the notion of “fail-safe”, and hence the definition of H(t) can be informed 
by the direct inclusion of TL operators, as noted in Section 5.1. I devise the following 
statement of Eq. (5.5) as representing the accident for the violation of the fail-safe 
safety principle in relation to the squat switch (ss) operation, where Vr is the rotation 
speed and ss is the signal coming from the squat switches, with ss = 0 indicating AIR 
mode (no compression of the MLG) and a value different from zero indicating 
GROUND mode. 
 
         [(● ss ≠ 0)   ∧   (ss = 0)]                   ∎   x < V!     (5.5) 
 
 Equation (5.5) consists of two statements, which read as follows: “at the 
previous instant the squat switch was sensing aircraft in GROUND mode AND in the 
present instant aircraft in AIR mode” (first bracket) AND “the airspeed up to (and 
including) the present instant of time has always been less than the rotation airspeed” 
(second bracket). Equation (11) thus identifies an accident as the situation in which the 
change from GROUND mode to AIR mode is sensed, but the airspeed is still less than 
the rotation speed. Since take off (and hence the switch to AIR mode) should not occur 
before Vr is reached, a violation of Eq. (5.5) reflects a serious safety concern with the 
system. Equation (5.5) sets a fundamental check that is missing from the design of the 
FADEC logic of the Learjet (and possibly of other aircraft as well) and needs to be 
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carefully considered by software developers and aircraft manufacturers. Its lack is a 
lurking accident pathogen waiting to contribute to further escalating an accident 
sequence, as was the case of the Learjet overrun. Proper checks of Eq. (5.5) should be 
executed before the FADEC overrides pilot’s requests to engage the thrust reversers.  
 Once the hazardous condition to avoid is defined, it is possible to set up a 
quantifiable hazard level function to monitor against it. Equation (5.6) provides one 
choice for the hazard level, where “Vcheck” and “Scheck” are binary functions defined in 
Eq. (5.7a,b), x is the aircraft position along the runway, and ℓ𝓁!" the runway length. 
 
H t =   V!"#!$ ∙ S!"#!$
!
ℓ𝓁!"
     (5.6) 
 
V!"#!$ =   
  1        𝑖𝑓  ∎  x < V!    
0          𝑖𝑓♦  x ≥ V!
             (5.7a) 
 
                 S!"#!$ =   
1        𝑖𝑓   ●  ss   ≠ 0   ∧ ss = 0 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒    
  0      𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                
           (5.7b) 
 
 The hazard level is scaled in proportion to the aircraft position on the runway so 
that the closer the vehicle is to the end of the runway the more hazardous the situation 
is. A criticality threshold Hcrit can be set up by defining a position of interest, after 
which the situation is considered critical. In this case, the critical threshold corresponds 
to values of H(t) greater than zero, as this indicated that Eq. (5.5) no longer holds true.   
 The hazard level defined in Eq. (5.6) is plotted in Figure 5.4 for the first 51 
seconds of the accident sequence (considering the output handled by the FADEC). It is 
possible to see that in correspondence with the tire explosion at about 30 seconds into 
the takeoff the hazard level escalates, a condition that holds up until about 35 seconds, 
and that causes a violation of the FS property. This happens as Eq. (4.8) prohibits the 
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increase in H(t) once the critical threshold is breached. A few seconds after the 
violation is detected the hazard level goes back to zero. This happens due to the aircraft 
reaching the rotation speed, and hence Vcheck zeroing out. The detection of a constraint 
violation is indicative of a problem in the system. In the case of Figure 5.4, this problem 
corresponds to the indication of AIR mode before the aircraft has reached the rotation 
speed, and thus, before the aircraft has actually taken off. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 FS property – associated hazard level plot and violation detection 
  As noted in Section 5.1 the verification of compliance with the TL safety 
properties serves a useful role during the design/development stages of a system, to 
ensure that situations such as the one depicted in Figure 5.4 do not unfold during 
operations. Should this be the case, the online application of the proposed framework 
allows to set up warnings and proper feedback to the pilot to recognize the problem. A 
violation of the TL property detected offline during the design/development stages 
would indicate to the designers (software developers or testers) that the check of Eq. 
(5.5) was not implemented in the FADEC, and would hence advise towards re-coding 
















 Figure 5.5 provides a screenshot of the implementation of the FS property of 
Eq. (4.8) in Simulink. The assertion block on the far right displays a warning when the 
property is violated, such as the one shown in Figure 5.6. To implement this principle I 
opted for the inclusion of a state chart to detect the change in the status of the squat 
switch. State charts offer a convenient tool for modeling discrete and event-driven 
subsystems.   
 
 
Figure 5.5 Implementation of the FS property in Simulink 
 
Figure 5.6 Warning detection example 
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 The lack of a check such as that of Eq. (5.5) allowed the FADEC to override the 
pilot’s request to engage the TR, and to automatically (and unknowingly to the pilot) 
shift to the forward thrust schedule. The remaining two questions are analyzed next, 
together with the inclusion of other possible barriers, warning signs, and indicators of 
the situation that could have helped the pilots and informed their decision-making even 
in the absence of the check of Eq. (5.5). 
 
ii. Was it safe for the pilots to initiate a rejected takeoff (RTO), and if not, 
how could they have been made aware of the danger? 
 
 To date, the thinking about the problem of setting regulations and guidelines for 
rejected takeoffs (RTO) has revolved around the notion of the decision speed V1. In 
chapter 3 this perspective was augmented through the introduction of a danger index 
based on the necessary stopping distance for the aircraft from the moment the RTO is 
initiated. This index considers the existence of an additional barrier (other than the 
regulatory condition on the decision speed V1) provided by the runway end safety area. 
The DID principle can thus be used to inform this novel metric, that is presented again 
for convenience in Eq. (5.8).  
 
𝐻 𝑡 = !!"#$ !
ℓ𝓁!"!!!"#$!!(!)
     (5.8) 
 
 As explained in chapter 3, the hazard level of Eq. (5.8) quantifies and relates the 
distance required for the aircraft to come to a stop (once a RTO is initiated) to the total 
length available to the aircraft before encountering an obstacle on its path. This length 
is computed as the runway length still available (given by the runway length ℓ𝓁!" minus 
the distance already traveled x(t)) plus the runway end safety area (dRESA). Rather than 
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defining the accident as a simple runway overrun, this danger index identifies the 
accident as that condition for which the stopping distance required would bring the 
aircraft beyond the limit of the RESA. In other words, the situation H(t) = 1 would thus 
identify either a collision with an obstacle and/or an excursion into  highly uneven 
terrain.  
 
Figure 5.7 Contours for the hazard level as a function of the RTO initial conditions.  
Full brakes and TR (best-case) 
  The calculation of the stopping distance dSTOP(t) depends on several 
factors, such as the speed at which the RTO is initiated, the position of the aircraft 
along the runway, the conditions of the runway (e.g., wet, dry,...), and the availability of 
the brakes and thrust reversers among other things. All of those conditions affect the 
analysis of the danger index of Eq. (5.8) when applied to the Learjet accident sequence. 
Consider once more, as was done in chapter 3, the best-case scenario (when full braking 
power and thrust reversers are available). By integrating Eq. (5.4) and computing the 
stopping distance for different initial conditions, the plot of Figure 5.7 is obatined 
(which was originally presented in Figure 3.6). A star on Figure 5.7 highlights the 













the first threshold represents situations in which the aircraft comes to a stop within a 
15% safety margin from the end of the RESA, while the second threshold corresponds 
to the accident unfolding. As can be seen, the RTO of the Learjet 60 was initiated in 
conditions very close to the HA = 1 threshold. 
 By comparison, it is interesting to analyze the worst-case scenario, when 
braking capabilities are severely compromised. In these conditions the contour levels 
are more skewed (as a longer stopping distance is required), and the situation becomes 
even more dire, as depicted in Figure 5.8. Once more, a star marker represents the 
airspeed/runway location coordinates of the Learjet when the pilots decided to opt for a 
RTO initiation.  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Contours for the hazard level as a function of the RTO initial conditions.  
Braking severely compromised (worst-case) 
 Plots such as the ones of Figure 5.7 and 5.8 would have advised the pilots 
against initiating the RTO, as the required stopping distance was (even in the best-case 
scenario of Figure 5.7) too close to the thresholds set up by the hazard level of Eq. 













for best-case and one for worst-case scenario) and can then be used during takeoff to 
support in real-time the go/no-go decision-making.  
 To illustrate the evolving condition of the takeoff, it is possible to superimpose 
the actual trajectory followed by the aircraft to the mapping of Figure 5.8. This is 
represented in Figure 5.9. The trajectory followed by the aircraft in time corresponds to 
different values of H(t) at each instant of time, and its computation allows the 
verification of the defense-in-depth constraints of Eq. (4.10a,b).  
 
 
Figure 5.9 Learjet trajectory during the accident sequence, superimposed to  
the contour levels of Figure 5.8 
 The contour levels of H(t) can be assessed in real-time and dynamically 
displayed to the pilots to help them make better RTO decisions. In the Learjet case, the 
analysis shows that a RTO could have been initiated up to about 25 seconds into the 
takeoff, after which the defense-in-depth prevention constraint is violated, shortly 
followed by the blocking/de-escalation one. At the time when the tire exploded (~30 
seconds), the proposed analysis and plot would have indicated to the pilots to “take the 

















the RESA (the prevention constraint sets a threshold at 85% of the available RESA) 
before bringing the aircraft to a stop.  
 
iii. Was it possible to warn the pilots that the inputs they selected in the 
cockpit were not being executed? 
 
 The Learjet accident sequence shows that the pilots initiated an RTO right after 
the decision speed V1 had been reached. As noted in the previous analysis, this is a 
critical situation even when not further aggravated by the shift to forward thrust 
schedule executed by the FADEC in response to (and overriding) the pilot’s request to 
engage the thrust reveres (TR). Nevertheless, this criticality could have been abated by 
checks and alarms implemented to warn the pilots of the situation and informing them 
of a discrepancy between the inputs selected in the cockpit and those actually executed 
by the FADEC. The need to check coordination and consistency of executed actions at 
different nodes in the line of subsystems that process a command is related to what was 
defined as the observability-in-depth (OID) safety principle, translated in the TL 
property of Eq. (4.11).   
 The OID principle supports the operators’ situational awareness and 
sensemaking of escalating hazardous situations. This principle requires among other 
things that a “correct” estimation of the hazard level should be achieved [Favarò and 
Saleh, 2014]. The “correctness” of the estimation process is expressed in terms of the 
discrepancy between two (or more) values of the hazard level H(t). In other words, the 
constraint of Eq. (4.11) requires the consistency among different “samples” of the 
hazard level. The Learjet case study displays significant violations of this principle, 
which is analyzed through the “split model” strategy presented in Section 5.2.2.  
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 The split model lends itself to a dichotomy of the model’s output, accounting for 
the “unfiltered” output obtained when pilot’s inputs in the cockpit are directly executed 
(bypassing the FADEC) and for “filtered” ones when the FADEC re-processes them (as 
is the case of the actual system design, which assigns full-authority to the FADEC). For 
the verification of the OID constraints, three hazard indices are considered: one for 
position, one for velocity, and one for acceleration. This way, the following two 
evaluations for the hazard level vectors are accounted for 
 








     (5.9) 
 
where the “actual” condition (subscript “act”) of Eq. (5.9) is obtained by integrating Eq. 
(5.4) using the inputs “filtered” by the FADEC subsystem, while the estimated 
condition (subscript “est”) is obtained by integrating Eq. (5.4) using the inputs provided 
by the pilots in the cockpit. 
 The three states are presented in Figure 5.10, with solid lines representing the 
actual hazard level of Eq. (5.9), and dashed lines representing the estimated one. Figure 
5.10 shows that up to about 33 seconds (the time at which the pilots called for thrust 
reversing), the split model outputs’ evaluations follow the same trends. As soon as the 
request for TR engagement is overridden by the FADEC, the states start to diverge, 
with the input that accounts for the backward thrust schedule at maximum throttle (as 
requested by the pilots) showing the aircraft slowing down, and finally stopping 
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somewhere beyond the end of the runway but before the RESA (and the concrete 
highway marker post)16. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Position, acceleration, and velocity of the aircraft as per FADEC output and as 
corresponding to the cockpit inputs provided by the pilots 
  The plots of Figure 5.10 can be computed by “sampling” the hazard level, 
which in this case corresponds to the state itself (plus the value of the acceleration), at 
                                                
 
 
16 Note that the conditions that unfolded during the Learjet accident sequence were not as dire as the ones 
predicted in Figure 5.8, which considered a worst-case scenario with severely compromised breaking 
capabilities beyond those encountered in the actual sequence.  The plots of Figures 5.8 and 5.9 provide 
thus a conservative estimation to better guide the RTO decision making and account for proper safety 
margins that should not be exceeded for safe procedures.  
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different nodes in the system (e.g., the filtered and unfiltered inputs). For instance, it is 
generally beneficial to check consistency of the expected controls to be executed on the 
system at the operator level and at the sensor/data bus level, especially at interfaces 
between different computers and digital components. When diverging states are 
discovered, the operators should use extreme caution in handling safety interventions. 
In fact, discrepancies in these estimations are indicative of violations of the OID 
principle. A violation of the OID principle during operations results in a degraded 
situational awareness, due to the fact that whenever different estimations of the hazard 
level are available, the operator can no longer rely on them, not knowing which one (if 
any) corresponds to the actual internal condition of the system. Violations of the OID 
principle are also indicative that additional instrumentation and sensoring are needed 
for the system, or that the existing sensoring is malfunctioning (as examined in [Saleh 
et al., 2014]). On a practical level, it is important that these consistency checks are 
executed during the design and development stages of a system, to avoid potential 
violations of the OID principle during operations.  
 The discrepancy between the outputs (of the two models in Figure 5.3) was in 
this case dictated by the fact that the different links in the chain of commands that 
started with the pilots in the cockpit and ended with the FADEC output were acting on 
inputs that were considered competing with each other (e.g., call for TR by the pilots 
and squat switch indicating AIR mode), and from requirements that did not support 
unconsidered scenarios (e.g., missing signal from squat switch treated as spurious AIR 
mode), which reflect the missing implementation of Eq. (5.5). 
 It is straightforward to compute the discrepancy between each component of 
H(t) and 𝐻(𝑡) of Eq. (5.9). For instance, Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the discrepancy 
for position and acceleration. As noted earlier, the fact that a discrepancy is present 
constitutes a violation of the first OID property (detected violations are shown in gray 




Figure 5.11 Position discrepancy, detection of OID violation, and times of barrier breaching 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Acceleration discrepancy, detection of OID violation, and times of barrier breaching 
 The second OID property analyzes whether such discrepancy is increasing in 
time, and puts it in relation to the breaching of the defense barriers placed along the 
accident trajectory (basically analyzing the conjunction of OID and DID). For the case 
in Figures 5.11 and 5.12, three operational takeoff checks are considered, provided by: 
reaching the decision speed V1; reaching rotation speed Vr; reaching 85% of the 
runway17. The times at which each barrier is breached are superimposed to the 
                                                
 
 
17 The FAA [2005] advises to choose runways that exceed by 15% the actual runway length required for 
takeoff by the aircraft.  
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discrepancy plots. As noted in [Favarò and Saleh, 2014], it is very important that proper 
warnings and alarms are set off and triggered by the breaching of subsequent barriers 
along the accident trajectory. Such warnings work toward improved situation 
awareness, and toward zeroing out the discrepancy between the actual and the estimated 
hazard level. 
 The superposition of barriers’ breaching times with the dynamical behavior of 
the discrepancy of the hazard level can be instrumental for understanding where proper 
sensoring and warning signs are needed most. For instance, Saleh et al. [2014a] 
analyzed violations of OID in relation to malfunctioning sensoring of a raffinate oil 
tank tower that led to a LoC-type of accident using a hazard level such as the one 
analyzed in chapter 3. The tower was instrumented with sensors that only covered five 
of the 170 feet high tower. Beyond the simple recommendation to include further 
instrumentation, better informed decisions regarding the re-design and re-engineering 
of the system can be obtained by examining where steeper jumps in the discrepancy of 
actual and estimated hazard level occurs, and positioning additional sensors at the 
heights corresponding to those jumps (as dictated by and according to Eq. (3.8)).  
 Finally, Figure 5.13 provides a screenshot of the OID property implementation 
in Simulink. When a user wishes to adopt a particular safety constraint for the analysis 
of a different system, little changes are required for its implementation. Whenever the 
same constraint formulation is used, the only required change is the danger index H(t) 





Figure 5.13 TL implementation of the OID property in Simulink 
 
5.3 Insights and Advantages Enabled by the Approach 
 The case study showed how hardware, software, and operators’ control actions 
and responses can be integrated within the framework for the proposed case. Software 
played a key role in the escalation of the accident sequence, which was analyzed in 
detail. 
 The framework and analytical tools here developed are meant to guide safety 
intervention (both online and offline), and to dynamically support in real-time 
operator’s situational awareness and decision-making regarding emerging hazardous 
situations. As such, it already adds value and an important complementary perspective 
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to traditional approaches to risk assessment and system safety, which do not support 
real-time use to inform the decision-making or to guide online safety interventions18.  
 On a general level, several advantages were highlighted deriving from the 
adoption of TL in conjunction with the proposed model-based framework. Those 
included: 
 
• The use of TL allowed more complex expressions of H(t) that include 
temporal operators. Explicit considerations of ordering and timing of events, 
faults, or sequence of states can thus be accounted for in the definition of H(t) 
itself. This provides significant benefits for expressing complex conditions or 
situations in a compact form, which is exceedingly difficult to render based on 
state variables alone. 
• The expression of TL safety properties is independent of the specific hazards 
functions H(t) of interest. While hazard functions are specialized and tailored 
to particular contexts, the TL safety properties are agnostic to the underlying 
system. They can be conceived of as elements within a broad library of safety 
properties that requires small adaptation efforts for the analysis of different 
dynamical systems. 
• By leveraging a language that is typical of software systems, the proposed 
approach allows the integration of both software and hardware components 
within the same framework.  
• By leveraging a formal language, the approach allows the automatic generation 
of warning signs (e.g., the display of error messages) whenever constraints are 
violated, or whenever critical thresholds for H(t) are about to be (b)reached. 
                                                
 
 
18 For a more detailed comparison with traditional PRA and DPRA capabilities see Appendix B.  
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This is an important capability for their online use, to support the operator’s 
situational awareness and sensemaking of the system conditions and the timely 
execution of safety interventions. 
 
 On a particular level, the application of the proposed framework to the specific 
Learjet case study enabled to uncover important findings beyond those proposed in the 
official accident investigation, and can be summarized as follows.  
 
• The analysis of the fail-safe safety property helped understanding an important 
condition predicated on airspeed thresholds needed to “debug” spurious AIR 
mode signals from the squat switches. By augmenting the flawed FADEC logic 
with a check for such condition it is possible to prevent the FADEC from 
wrongly estimating that the aircraft is in AIR mode, and remove a lurking 
accident pathogen from the system.   
• A danger index in support of online pilots’ decision-making for rejecting a 
takeoff was devised. This index depends on the distance necessary to bring the 
aircraft to a full stop and accounts for a region beyond the end of the runway, 
and before obstacles are encountered, to be used as safety area. Mappings for 
best-case and worst-case scenarios (depending on how compromised the aircraft 
performance/ braking capabilities are) could have informed the pilots of the 
Learjet and advised against RTO initiation.  
• Important violations of the OID principle during the Learjet accident sequence 
were highlighted, which contributed to a degraded situational awareness on the 
part of the pilots. To counteract such violations it is of paramount importance to 
set up consistency checks among different samples of the hazard level captured 
at different subsystem nodes/interfaces, for instance comparing the system 
output resulting by different sets of inputs. For the Learjet case, two sets of 
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inputs were used: those “filtered” by the FADEC subsystem, and those 
“unfiltered” that bypassed the FADEC and acted upon the inputs provided by 
the pilots in the cockpit.  
 
 As noted by Leveson [2004b], “many of the problems found in human 
automation interaction lie in the human not getting appropriate feedback to monitor the 
automation and to make informed decisions”. This was certainly the case of the present 
case study, and the analysis showed how the proposed approach can in this case better 
inform both the on-line decision-making, and the off-line system design during 
development stages, to ensure proper feedback is provided to the operators regarding 
the system internal conditions.  








CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 This chapter concludes the thesis. It is structured in the following way. Section 
6.1 presents a summary of the contributions accomplished by the proposed framework. 
Section 6.2 explores the potential for further research opportunities and expansions 
related to the material here presented. 
6.1 Summary of Contributions 
 The end-objective of this work was to contribute to improving (dynamic) risk 
assessment and accident prevention. To this effect, a synthesis of key limitations of 
PRA was provided first, together with the improvements currently proposed in the 
literature (Chapter 2). These issues constituted the main motivation for the present 
efforts. I then made the case for model-based approaches and the use state variables, in 
particular in relation to the development of danger indices and the monitoring of hazard 
dynamics for improved risk assessment. This allowed to introduce a novel safety 
supervisory control framework. The development of its analytical tools, and the notion 
of hazard temporal contingency for dynamic risk assessment and for guiding safety 
interventions to improve accident prevention were presented as one of the two 
ingredients that constitute the approach (Chapter 3). The second ingredient was that of 
Temporal Logic (TL) and its use for the verification of safety properties predicated on 
the notion of hazard level (Chapter 4).  
 The framework and analytical tools here developed were grounded in Control 
Theory and Computer Science. 
 On the one hand, Control Theory inspired the use of the state-space 
representation in modeling dynamical systems. The use of state variables allowed the 
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definition of hazard levels or danger indices, which measured the “proximity” of the 
system to adverse events. Furthermore, I showed that the adoption of state-space 
formalism enables the estimation of the times at which critical thresholds for the hazard 
level are (b)reached. This estimation process provides important prognostic information 
and produces a proxy for a time-to-accident metric or advance notice for an impending 
adverse event. These hazard coordinates were displayed in a hazard temporal 
contingency map to support operators’ situational awareness, and help them prioritize 
attention and defensive resources for accident prevention. The monitoring of hazard 
levels and the estimation of the time window available for safety interventions provide 
important feedback for various stakeholders and decision-makers to guide safety 
interventions both on-line (towards accident prevention and/or mitigation) and off-line 
(towards re-design and re-engineering of safer systems). 
 On the other hand, Computer Science inspired the use of TL for the 
specification of safety properties towards the creation of an automatic safety 
verification process. Properties expressed in TL are agnostic to the specifities of the 
system under consideration, and create a pervasive and universal library of safety 
properties that can be used for the analysis of any dynamical system. Moreover, 
Temporal Logic allowed to overcome some of the time-related limitations of traditional 
PRA. Through the adoption of TL, specific considerations on temporal ordering can be 
included directly in the analytical definition of the hazard level. Additionally, the 
formal language of TL and the choice of Simulink as simulation environment allowed 
to model both hardware and software components within the same framework and to 
automatically set up error messages displays and alarms to warn the operators of 
violations of the TL properties.  
 The capabilities of the framework were displayed through the detailed analysis 
of a case study involving a runway overrun (Chapter 5). The integrated framework 
showed that the proposed approach informed important recommendations for new TL 
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safety constraint that could have prevented the hazardous situation, in this case a 
rejected takeoff following tire explosion, from turning into a fatal accident. Moreover, 
novel metrics for online support of pilots’ decision-making were developed, which can 
also better inform accident investigation and provide recommendations for the 
prevention of similar occurrences in the future.     
 The work here presented sought to augment the current perspective in traditional 
risk assessment and its reliance on probabilities as the fundamental modeling ingredient 
with the notion of temporal contingency, a novel dimension by which hazards are 
dynamically prioritized and ranked based on the temporal vicinity of their associated 
accident(s) to being released. 
 The proposed approach has the potential to eliminate the reliance on expert 
opinion for assessing the probabilities associated with the sequences of adverse events 
and conceiving of accident scenarios. However several new challenges are raised. For 
example, more reliance is placed on the analysts who develop the model of the system 
and identify the hazard levels of interest (i.e., high level of modeling expertise is 
required, as well as in-depth knowledge of the system). Note that the choice of the H(t) 
functions of interest can be informed by the particular safety requirements imposed for 
the system. Another challenge for the practical implementation of any model-based 
approach to system design and operation is related to the proliferation of the number of 
states to consider (known as the state explosion problem). This problem requires careful 
consideration of model order reduction and computational implementation (especially 
for real-time hazard monitoring and estimations). Finally a set of challenges are raised 
in relation to the verification and validation of such analytics, as well as the human 
factors considerations in using/interfacing with the proposed safety supervisory control 
approach. 
 While more research is certainly needed, I believe the prospects and potential 
advantages offered by the framework and tools here introduced outweigh the challenges 
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they raise, and they constitute a rich area for further development. A case study was 
here presented as “proof-of-concept” of the proposed theoretical developments, and the 
tools presented allow for the creation of a test-bed that, with additional research, can 
provide important complementary insights to those provided by traditional approaches 
to risk assessment. Several research paths forward are possible and some were outlined 
throughout this text, and are summarized in the next section. Some authors have 
recently argued for the need to leverage automation for risk assessment and 
management; this model-based approach provides one step in this direction. I hope this 
work (and the ensuing publications) will enrich the intellectual toolkit of risk 
researchers and safety professionals, and will invite further contributions from the 
community to improve (dynamic) risk assessment and accident prevention.  
6.2 Future Work 
Two paths can be envisioned to guide future work and extensions of the proposed 
approach. The first involves detailed applications of the framework for additional 
benchmark and proof-of-concept examples. The second path involves further 
development to better exploit the benefits deriving from the application of the 
framework and from the use of Temporal Logic. 
 This second path is better analyzed next.  
6.2.1 Monitoring vs. Model Checking: Towards Automated Safety Verification 
 In the present work the verification of compliance with the TL safety 
requirements was achieved through direct monitoring of the properties (implemented 
using the Design Verifier toolbox in Simulink). A second approach, other than 
monitoring, for the formal verification of TL properties exists, and it is that of model 
checking. Model checking verification is grounded in mathematical abstraction and 
automata theory, and does not require running a simulation or monitoring/displaying a 
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property directly. Model checking allows to automatically verify compliance of TL 
safety properties, and provides immediate counter-examples whenever violations are 
encountered (i.e., providing examples of unthought accident scenarios). Model 
checking can greatly help towards ensuring an exhaustive verification process. To this 
same end, note that the case study analyzed a single scenario, with pre-specified inputs 
to model the accident sequence of the Learjet 60. Multiple scenarios can be easily 
handled without changes to the model (e.g. providing different sets of inputs with 
switches to analyze one case at a time). Additionally, Simulink Design Verifier has the 
capability of automatically generating test cases for the system’s inputs to extend the 
model coverage. This process makes use of structural verification techniques to make 
sure there are no “unused paths” in the system model, with the capability of integrating 
formal methods within the framework just presented. 
 A second idea is related to the offline use of the TL safety constraints for the 
validation of a design during the development stages. The use of TL allows to set up an 
automatically verifiable machinery, which in offline applications does not require to 
display and directly examine plots of the hazard level such as the ones presented in 
chapter 3 and chapter 5 (e.g., Figures 3.5, 5.9, 5.10) for the verification of compliance 
of the safety properties. This capability is important during development stages (i.e., 
offline applications) since in general hundreds of scenarios with different inputs (e.g., 
different profiles of thrust and the call for TR engagement by the pilots at different 
times) are considered at a time. In these situations, it is not possible for the analyst to 
actually display all the values of H(t) for the different scenarios tested, and an automatic 
procedure is needed to warrant the analyst’s attention only for relevant cases. The 
expression of constraints in TL allows to generate warnings of constraint violations that 
will warrant close attention and direct H(t)-plots analysis only for unthought of 
scenarios, which are the ones that will (most likely) fail the verification process,  to 
validate the system design and/or support system re-engineering. 
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6.2.2 Displays and Visual Aides Development 
 A recurrent problem with modern techniques for probabilistic risk assessment 
and DPRA in general is that of output post-processing, as was analyzed in chapter 2. 
This issue concerns the display and generation of an output for ready and easy risk 
communication [Zio, 2014].  
 Although beyond the immediate scope of the present work, it is worth noting 
that the proposed framework lends itself to the development of intuitive control panels 
in support of safety-related decision-making. Intuitive displays that inform the operators 
of the system condition (in terms of the associated hazard levels) and of where attention 
is needed most can guide actionable insight for better-informed safety interventions.  
 Simulink allows to integrate and interface good visualization aides with the 
analysis carried out in this work. For instance, note that in general there are a few TL 
properties that the analyst wishes to verify for a range of different hazard levels. A 
control panel such as the one of Figure 6.1 can be set up to warrant the close attention 































Figure 6.1 Illustrative “control panel” for monitoring the verification of TL properties against multiple 
hazard levels. The red circle is indicative of violated properties, the green circle stands for compliance. 
Hazard levels that indicate a violation of the property warrant closer attention (e.g., HFS2, HDID1 and HOID2 
in the Figure) 
 
 Moreover, when the analyst wishes to monitor multiple hazard levels at a time, 
different visual aides can be developed, for instance similar to the radar plot provided in 
Figure 6.2, which shows the concurrent monitoring of eight danger indices and is 





Figure 6.2 Illustrative  “radar plot” for concurrent monitoring of multiple hazard levels. Dotted line 
represent the accident threshold for each index, solid line represents the instantaneous value of each 
index 
  
  I believe the ideas brought forward in this section are worth investigating as 
promising venues for future contributions to the risk and safety communities. They 
constitute good topics in the context of cognitive engineering and human factors. 
Design and experimental testing of displays based on the ideas presented here can work 










































NOTES ON HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL 
 
 The term “supervisory control” has been used in the past to describe the layout 
and role of software agents as an aid to collect and display system measurements, 
towards detection of flawed performance and failures. In particular, human supervisory 
control addresses the relationship between a human and a machine (or cyber-physical 
system) interacting with each other “to transform data or to produce control actions” 
[Sheridan, 2012]. The “human” qualification was introduced to highlight the 
fundamental role of the operators in relation to the sensemaking of the information 
provided by the software agents. 
 Supervisory control is found in a broad range of applications, from obstacle 
avoidance in the military context, to therapy and dosage control in the medical one. 
Over the past three decades the research on human supervisory control has focused on 
important aspects related to: the study of tradeoffs between the level of automation and 
the need of human operators in the loop (e.g., to whom assign authority and when); the 
design and monitoring of intuitive displays and, more generally, the strategies on how 
to provide the feedback collected by the software agents to the operator in a clear and 
concise manner (e.g., integrated displays in support of decision-making); regulations 
and policy regarding human supervisory control, and its social implications. 
 The generality of the idea of human supervisory control was developed by 
Sheridan and colleagues at MIT in the 1960s [Sheridan, 1960; Ferrell and Sheridan, 
1967]. To date however, the idea of human supervisory control is still little understood 
and leveraged in a formal way [Sheridan, 2012]. There exists a multitude of models for 
the implementation of supervisory control (see [Sheridan, 2012] for a high-level 
review). In general, five functions are to be performed: 
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1) Planning: first phase for off-line understanding and planning of what task to 
accomplish and how; 
2) Teaching: second phase for off-line programming of the software agents, which 
are taught what was planned; 
3) Monitoring: third phase for on-line detection of failures (or confirmation of 
nominal conditions) through (possibly automatic) monitoring of the state 
information; 
4) Intervention: fourth phase for on-line intervention on the task to specify a new 
goal for the system; 
5) Learning: final phase for the off-line analysis of the lesson learnt from the 
experience, to improve future performance.  
 
Figure A.1 Flowchart of the five supervisory functions. Adapted from [Sheridan, 1992] 
  
 The five supervisory functions are represented in the flowchart of Figure A.1. 
Sheridan [2012] frames these function within three nested loops (not shown in Figure 
























(i) An inner loop of the monitoring function within itself that invites further 
monitoring and investigation whenever abnormal situations are detected;  
(ii) An intermediate loop between the intervening and the teaching functions, since 
the intervention function ends with the specification of a new goal that has to be 
programmed/taught back to the computer; 
(iii) An outer loop that informs new tasks planning based on the learnt experience. 
 
 The proposed framework targeted a specific application of supervisory control 
for model-based hazard monitoring and the verification of safety properties, towards the 
sustainment of system safety, improved accident prevention, and to guide and inform 
safety interventions. Although different techniques and tools were used in this work (in 
relation to the use of state-space representation for the definition of danger indices and 
the adoption of temporal logic to express safety constraints), many of the considerations 
brought forward in this work can be related to the realm of supervisory control.  
 































 The framework modeled and presented in Figure 1.2 can be compared to that 
of Figure A.1 proposed by Sheridan. A few distinctions can be highlighted. Figure A.2 
shows a possible adaptation of the flowchart proposed by Sheridan to the work and 
framework here presented. 
 It is possible to highlight differences in three major areas: 
 
1) Functions/phases performed: Figure A.2 highlights six phases, and divides 
them in accordance to the presentation of the work carried out in the thesis. The 
original Planning phase of Figure A.1 is now divided into the “model 
development” and the “planning of the monitoring effort” phases. The off-line 
planning of the task to accomplish is thus translated into: (i) the creation of the 
mathematical model for the dynamical system under consideration; and (ii) the 
identification of the hazard levels of interest, informed by the specific safety 
requirements and constraints imposed for the system. Additionally, the original 
Teaching phase was incorporated inside the first two functions, given the fact 
that the system controller synthesis is included in the model development phase 
and that no further software programming is required once the constraints are 
translated in temporal logic and the hazard levels are identified. The third 
original function of Monitoring now translates into the “monitoring execution” 
phase and includes the process of monitoring the danger indices as well as 
verifying the TL safety properties. I included a novel function termed “online 
analysis” to capture the supporting role of the hazard temporal contingency map 
to allocate the attention of operators and to support decision-making for safety 
interventions. The original Intervention phase now assumes the name of 
“control execution” given the proposed control-based framework. Similarly to 
the original flowchart, the approach ends with the “learning” phase. 
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2) Internal wiring of the blocks: The blocks of Figure A.2 are now wired 
differently, according to the process examined in the thesis. Important 
differences are related to: (i) the removal of the wiring between the strategy 
formulation (original Planning phase) and the execution of the control actions 
(original Teaching and Intervene phases); and (ii) the location of the “attention 
allocation” block, now moved as a final step before the control actions 
execution rather than as a first step to process the incoming system information. 
Both changes reflect the central and key role of the hazard-level monitoring, 
with the estimation of the time-to-accident metric, and of the verification of the 
TL safety properties, to inform safety interventions. 
3) Feedback loops definition: Figure A.2 highlights the existence of two feedback 
loops. Rather than dividing the loops by “location” as in the original 
formulation of supervisory control, I prefer to divide them in the two categories 
of online feedback and offline feedback. Offline feedback (i.e., for offline safety 
interventions) acts on the whole process through changes in the model 
development and the monitoring planning phases, and through its effect on the 
process info (e.g., the decision on which quantities to measure in the system or 
to select as system output). Re-design and re-engineering of the system are 
examples of offline interventions, and so is the adjusting of the hazard level 
definition and of the ensuing constraints. Online feedback (i.e., for online safety 
interventions) informs the execution of the control actions based on the 
diagnostic and prognostic information deriving from the monitoring execution 
and the online analysis phases. Online interventions are reflected in the 
trimming and adjustments of the control matrix Ψ for the hazard equation. 
 
 Many authors regard failure detection and diagnosis as the most important 
human supervisory role [Moray, 1986]. While recognizing its importance, at the same 
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time this work added a prognostic dimension, through the estimation of the time-to-
accident metric. This addition also enabled the prioritization of the interventions, based 
on the ranking of emerging hazards in the temporal contingency map. This is an 
important ingredient for allocating operators’ attention. Means for discerning among the 
multitude of information coming from different sources are often advocated in 
supervisory control, and this work provided a novel metric to this end.   
 Finally, a separate mention should be given to the problem of observability-in-
depth (OID). Other authors have highlighted the importance of being able to diagnose 
the lack of observability in a system [Ferris at al., 2010]. Especially in the context of 
interfacing humans with automation, it is important to guarantee that both components 
are acting on the same understanding of the system behavior (i.e., ensuring that there 
are no discrepancies between the actual and the estimated conditions). In human 
supervisory control, computer-based observers can work as an aid to a human 
supervisor according to the process described in Figure A.3. This process leverages the 
creation of a model for the process under examination that serves for direct output 
comparison with the actual system. 
 
Figure A.3 Computer-based observer as an aid to the supervisor. Adapted from [Sheridan, 2012] 
 
 Sheridan [2012] advocates the use of computer-based observation to estimate 
quantities that are not directly measured in the system. In the proposed framework, the 
OID principle tackles many important aspects in this regard. First, it works toward 










for a comparison of the system output, as in Figure A.3, but also achieves a comparison 
of the estimated state). Secondly, it ensures that in case of discrepancy, proper warning 
signs and alarms are set off whenever safety barriers are (b)reached, in support of the 
operators’ sensemaking. Moreover, this work highlighted the importance to apply the 
principles behind OID also to different model-based estimations of the hazard level 
(i.e., two or more estimations coming from the model of the plant itself). In other 
words, in addition to what described in Figure A.3 (comparison with system output) the 
work also reviewed applications of the OID principle within the process model block of 
Figure A.3 in isolation. Ensuring consistency checks in the estimations of the hazard 
level at different nodes of the system model served as an important indicator of proper 
instrumentation and sensoring of the system. Finally, chapter 5 highlighted the 
importance of executing the consistency checks during the design and development 






A COMPARISON WITH PRA TECHNIQUES 
 
 The application of PRA techniques for assessing the risk associated to a given 
system is related in many cases to the need of certifying it according to specific 
regulations and policies.  
 This is the case of many aerospace systems, which abide by very strict 
certification procedures. The ARP4754 outlines the recommended practices for the 
development of civil aircraft and system in support of their future certification. The 
tools of PRA (e.g., fault and event tree analyses) have a fundamental role in this 
process, which is schematized in Figure B.1. 
 
 
Figure B.1 Integrated process for aircraft safety design [ARP 4754] 
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 Fault tree analysis (FTA), reliability block diagrams (RBD) and failure modes 
and effects analysis (FMEA) have an important role both for requirements development 
and identification, and for system verification. Generally, a complex system such as an 
aircraft undergoes a physical and a functional decomposition, and requirements are then 
set up for each component.  
 To compare how the proposed approach differs and relates to standard PRA 
techniques, it is possible to briefly analyze how the PSSA and SSA ((preliminary) 
system safety analysis) processes work and how they makes use of PRA tools.  
 In a general perspective, both (P)SSA and the proposed approach start with the 
definition of requirements for the system, which are then verified in order to validate 
the specific design. In the proposed approach, requirement definition is expressed in 
temporal logic through quantitative constraints on the hazard level H(t) and the 
definition of criticality thresholds for safe behavior. In traditional approaches 
requirements are defined in terms of accepted probabilities of failures. For instance, to 
draw a parallel with the case study analyzed in this work, for the FADEC subsystem, 
which combines both hardware and software components, requirements are derived by 
several standards such as the RTCA/DO-160/-178-C/-254, 14 CFR/AC 33.28 and 
present the following exemplary format: 
 
“	  FADEC	  mode	  failure	  during	  takeoff	  and	  landing	  shall	  be	  less	  than	  3.5E-­‐9	  and	  
during	  cruise	  shall	  be	  less	  than	  3.5E-­‐7”	  
 
 In other words, this type of requirements set up a limit for the “maximum 
tolerable failure” [NASA, 2002]. The problem now revolves around the estimation of 
the probability of failure of the component of interest. Traditional PRA relies on the 
physical and functional decompositions of the component to identify possible failure 
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modes and mechanisms. The overall probability of failure is then obtained by 
aggregating together the probabilities associated to each failure mode.   
 Fault trees are one of the means for assessing this overall probability, and are 
among the most used PRA tool in industry. FTA is a top-down deductive approach, 
where a top-level event (e.g., the failure of the component of interest, or generally any 
undesired event) is decomposed and analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series 
of lower-level events down to basic or primitive events that are no further decomposed. 
The probabilities of the basic events are assessed based on field data or on expert 
judgment. Those probabilities are then combined according to the wiring of the logical 
gates and the events in the tree, up to the top-event failure. The requirement satisfaction 
is then analyzed by comparing the top-event probability with the maximum allowed 




Figure B.2 Example of typical fault tree, [NASA, 2002] 
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 Fault tree analysis can be used for requirement validation as well as a 
benchmarking tool to compare different designs. For instance, the engine control unit 
(ECU) of the FADEC subsystems is generally dual redundant, and the effect of this 
redundancy can be assessed by comparing two separate fault trees: one that considers 
redundancy and one that does not. The overall probability associated to the top-event 
lets then the designer know how positive the effect of redundancy is in order to satisfy a 
specific requirement.  
 The process briefly outlined before is fundamental for the certification of the 
system of interest. However, it does not provide any insight on online and real-time risk 
assessment during system operation, and it rarely provides insight on what safety 
features to embed in the system should a specific requirement be violated. The 
proposed approach complements this view by adding the dimension of temporal 
contingency, which guides online safety interventions, and the verification of safety 
constraints that can guide offline interventions for assessing the need to include 
additional safety features in the system. Moreover, PRA approaches rely on the 
existence of extensive field data for the systems of interest, which is rarely the case for 
new and avant-garde systems. Whenever field data is not available, these processes rely 
on the opinion of experts of the field, who estimate plausible values for the missing 
probabilities based on their personal experience. Relying on different experts leads to 
sometimes contradictory results, and is generally accounted for as one of the main 
limitations of PRA (both in its static and in its dynamic counter-part).  
 Table B.1 shows a summary of the capabilities and benefits of the proposed 





Table B.1 Comparison of the approaches 





Model-based SSC and 
hazard monitoring 





Based on the notion of 
temporal contingency for 
a given hazard level 
function 
Inclusion and modeling 
of physical phenomena 
(e.g. failure physics) 
and external 
environment 
NO YES YES  
Recovery modeling and 
handling NO YES 
YES (can be included in 
dynamical model 
description) 
Human Factor Analysis 
HRA but no model 
for human response 
during an accident 
Can include model of 
operator response in 
simulation 
Can include model of 
operator response in 
simulation 
Inclusion of 
Organizational factors NO 
NO (not in standard 
frameworks anyway) NO 
Provides insight on 
real-time risk 
mitigation and risk 
management strategies 
NO NO 
YES (based on the 
monitoring and analysis 
of the hazard level 
dynamics) 
Inclusion of software 
and interfaces handling NO YES (in part) YES 
Capable of handling 
scenario-based results YES YES YES 
Possibility of state 
exploration (i.e., 
verification not based 
on scenario) 
NO 
NO (but state 
exploration efforts for 
this approach are under 
research) 
YES (through model 
checking, at least for the 
software sub-blocks) 
Requires expert 
opinion and judgment 










High High (can potentially be automated) 
 
 The approach proposed is comparable in several respects with DPRA. Both 
DPRA and the proposed approach provide additional and complementary insights to 
traditional PRA. As highlighted in the thesis this comes from the analysis of time-
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related issues modeled in the system’s dynamics (hence allowing the analysis of 
failures ordering and time-dependent-performances) at the expenses of a higher 
computational effort.  
 The proposed approach eliminates the reliance on expert opinion and judgment 
for the calculation of the probabilities associated to the transition from nominal to off-
nominal states. Conversely, more reliance is placed on the analyst that creates the 
model of the system and identifies the hazard levels of interest. This last consideration 
is related to the limitations and challenges that need to be addressed for the 
development and the practical implementation of the approach proposed in this thesis to 
a workable industry standard. Those include the following issues. First, model-based 
approaches are subject to the problem of state explosion. This problem can be 
potentially addressed by only considering the state-space models for the subsystems of 
interest and by interfacing models of different formats within the same simulation 
environment (e.g., only consider the transfer functions for elements that are not relevant 
for the analysis, consider state-charts and truth tables to model software components, 
etc.). Secondly, the approach requires a good process knowledge and substantial 
background in dynamical systems’ modeling on the part of the analyst, in addition to 
the need of creative ingenuity to come up with meaningful forms of the hazard level 
and for the implementation of the safety constraints. Note however, that the choice of 
the H(t) functions of interest can be informed by the particular safety requirements 
imposed for the system and furthermore, that the creation of the safety constraints (and 
their implementation in Simulink) is a one-time effort, as a library of properties can be 
created and then applied to any dynamical system of interest.  
 Finally, it is interesting to note that the NTSB report filled out as part of the 
investigation for the Learjet accident highlights the fundamental role of the under-
inflated tires as the main concern for recommendations to the FAA and for improving 
the certification process. Findings such as the following appear in the report, and show 
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also how traditional approaches to accident investigation are informed by the 
certification practices: 
 
“The Federal Aviation Administration’s legal interpretation that checking tire 
pressures on a Learjet 60 is preventive maintenance has an unintended negative 
effect on the safety of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 operations 
because, according to the provisions of 14 CFR 43.3, a Learjet 60 pilot who is 
allowed to perform preventive maintenance, such as tire pressure checks, on the 
airplane for a flight operated under 14 CFR Part 91 is prohibited from 
performing the checks on the same airplane for a Part 135 flight.” [NTSB, 2010] 
 
“The tire design and testing requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 
25.733 may not adequately ensure tire integrity because they do not reflect the 
actual static and dynamic loads that may be imposed on tires both during normal 
operating conditions and after the loss of one tire, especially if the tires are 
operated at their load rating, and the requirements may not adequately account 
for tires that are operated at less-than-optimal conditions.” [NTSB, 2010] 
 
 While the importance of this contributory factor (which can be viewed as the 
immediate initiating event) is recognized, the proposed analysis uncovered important 
flaws in both the decision-making process for the RTO (together with flaws in the 
regulatory suggestions related to the V1 decision speed), and in the logic for the 
distinction of air/ground mode based on the inputs provided to the FADEC subsystem. 
The framework proposed in this work allowed novel insights also for accident 
investigation, that leveraged the notions of safety bounds and danger indices for 
understanding the critical conditions that unfolded during a particular accident sequence 
and informed novel decision-making support tools to improve current regulations. The 
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violation of specific constraints and safety principles also allowed to highlight findings 
that go beyond the pinpointing of flaws in the certification process and provided 




PRIMITIVES OF CAUSALITY AND THE NOTION OF AGONIST, 
ANTAGONIST, AND INVERSE AGONIST 
 
 The notion of hazard-level was intuitively conceived as the closeness of an 
accident to being released. It is thus related to the extent an accident sequence has 
advanced: the further the sequence has escalated, the more hazardous the situation is for 
a given accident end-state A.  
 The dynamics of the hazard level can be defined in a similar manner to the 
behavior in time of the failure rate of a component in reliability engineering. For 
instance, the common (descriptive) bath tub curve (as the one in Figure C.1) describes 
failure behaviors of a component characterized by three separate regions: a region of 
decreasing failure rate that models infant mortality; a region of approximately constant 
failure rate that models random failure; and a region of increasing failure rate that 
models wear-out.  
 
 
Figure C.1 Bath-tub curve 
  
 Similarly, three archetypes of dynamic behaviors for the hazard level can be 




dλ(t)/dt < 0 dλ(t)/dt ~ 0 dλ(t)/dt > 0 
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behavior corresponds to a transition from an initial system state to a subsequent state 
(with the two states possibly coinciding in the case of hazard constancy). This transition 
is traced back to the interaction of three categories of actions termed Agonist, 
Antagonist, and Inverse Agonist actions. These categories of actions help expand the 
terminology used to analyze accident trajectories and provide a better lexicon for 
describing the hazard level dynamics, which can provide insight towards prevention of 
similar accidents in the future (as Confucius said: “the beginning of wisdom is to call 
things by their proper name”).  
 The three categories of actions are borrowed from different contexts: 
 
• The notions of Agonist and Antagonist were originally proposed by Talmy 
[2000] in the context of cognitive linguistics to indicate the opposing effects of 
two forces. 
• The concept of Inverse Agonist is adopted in biochemistry in the context of 
catalysts-aided chemical reactions where an inverse agonist is a chemical agent 
that binds to a receptor to induce a biochemical response that is the opposite of 
the one expected. 
 
 In the context of accident causation, the concepts of Agonist, Antagonist and 
Inverse Agonist actions are related to their effect on the system hazard level for a given 
accident sequence. Unimpeded Agonist actions push the system state on a trajectory of 
hazard escalation; if they are sustained over time, they can lead to accident unfolding. 
Conversely, Antagonist actions can block Agonists and prevent hazard escalation (or 
prevent further advancement of the accident sequence). Finally, Inverse Agonist actions 
engage the system in hazard de-escalation. These concepts are formalized as follows: 
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• An Agonist (indicated by a ) is defined as an action applied to the system 
leading to a transition of the accident sequence towards a higher hazard level 
(hazard escalation). The hazard level dynamics due to an agonist action can be 
represented as in Figure C.2, and is symbolically expressed as: 
 
          a→ dH (t)
dt
> 0                                      (C1) 
 
 
Figure C.2 Hazard dynamics due to Agonist action  
 
• An Antagonist (indicated by a ) is defined as an action applied to the system 
that blocks an Agonist action. Therefore, the hazard level reaches a stationary 
point whenever a successful Antagonist action occurs, and the hazard dynamics 
is blocked (hazard constancy). The hazard dynamics due to an antagonist action 
is represented in Figure C.3, and is expressed as: 
 
               a→ dH (t)
dt














Figure C.3 Hazard dynamics due to an Antagonist action 
 
 
• An Inverse Agonist (indicated by ia ) is defined as an action applied to 
overcome the effects of an Agonist action, leading when successful to a 
transition of the state towards a lower hazard level (hazard de-escalation).  The 
hazard level dynamic due to an Inverse Agonist action is represented in Figure 
C.4, and is symbolically expressed as: 
 
                     ia→ dH (t)
dt
< 0      (C3) 
 
 
Figure C.4 Hazard dynamics due to an Inverse Agonist action 
  
 The notions of Agonist, Antagonist and Inverse Agonist should not be restricted 
to the idea of physical actions on the system (e.g., pushing an emergency button, 






















inverse agonist  
action 
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agonists can be of different nature, technical (hardware and software), operational, and 
regulatory. Different types of safety levers exist and can be acted upon to prevent an 
accident from unfolding (as antagonists and inverse agonists).  
 The presented concepts enable a rethinking of the traditional notion of causality, 
detailing accident causation into finer primitives, as presented next. 
 In his study on force dynamics for cognitive linguistics, Talmy [2000] 
introduces “force dynamics” as a generalization of the traditional notion of “causative”. 
In studying how entities interact after the exertion of an external force, Talmy identifies 
what he calls “finer primitives” that can recombine in different patterns to produce a 
specific system behavior. The novelty of his work was to propose that what had been 
viewed as “an irreducible concept” (the “cause-effect implication” relationship) could 
be seen “as a complex build up of primitive concepts” [Talmy, 2000]. Borrowing some 
of these concepts and extending their application beyond the language and cognition 
context for the purpose of better detailing accident causation, interactions between 
Agonist and Antagonist actions and interactions between Agonist and Inverse Agonist 
actions are analyzed next and related to an accident sequence evolution.  
 The interactions of Agonist, Antagonist, and Inverse Agonist actions lead to the 
identification and the articulation of what is referred to next as primitives of causality 
(PoC). The implications of the introduction of the primitives of causality for accident 
prevention will be evident afterwards. These interactions involve both static and 
dynamic considerations: Agonist, Antagonist, and Inverse Agonist action will either be 
present in the system, or added/removed by external agents, as presented next.  
Interactions between Agonist and Antagonist Actions 
 Talmy’s work on force dynamics in language and cognition is based on the 
assumptions that “underlying all more complex force-dynamic patterns is the steady-
state opposition of two forces”, namely the Agonist and the Antagonist actions. This 
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approach is here extended to consider the possibility of presence, absence, and/or 
removal of Agonist and Antagonist forces. All the possible combinations of this 
interaction can be represented in a matrix form, as in Figure C.5, with each axis 
corresponding to one type of action. Agonist actions are located on the x-axis, and 
Antagonist actions on the y-axis. A value of 0 corresponds to absence; a value of 1 to 
presence. The possibility of removal of the Antagonist (defensive) action by an external 
agent corresponds to a value of -1. 
 
 
Figure C.5 Agonist and Antagonist Interactions in matrix form 
 
 Each combination of {x, y} coordinates represents a different primitive of 
causality: 
 
• Direct Causation: Coordinates {1, 0}: this primitive originates from an 
unimpeded Agonist action pushing the system to a more hazardous state. The 
causal relationship between the cause “Agonist action presence” and the effect 




Figure C.6 Direct Causation primitive of causality 
 The direct causation primitive is what is traditionally understood as causality 
given the direct cause-effect implication stemming from the absence of any defensive 
resource.  
 
• Blocking: Coordinates {1, 1+}: this primitive originates from the presence of 
both an agonist and an antagonist action on the system, with an Antagonist 
action stronger than the Agonist action19. The causal relationship between the 
cause “Agonist and antagonist action presence” and the effect “blocked hazard 
escalation” is defined as the blocking primitive of causality (Figure C.7).  
 
 
Figure C.7 Blocking primitive of causality 
                                                
 
 
19 The fact that the Antagonist is able to overcome the Agonist action is represented in the coordinate 






















• Despite: Coordinates {1, 1-}: this primitive originates from the presence of both 
an Agonist and an Antagonist action on the system, with an Agonist action 
stronger than the Antagonist action20. The causal relationship between the cause 
“Agonist and Antagonist action presence” and the effect “unblocked hazard 
escalation” is defined as the despite primitive of causality (Figure C.8). 
 
Figure C.8 Despite primitive of causality 
• Prevention: Coordinates {0, 1}: this primitive originates from the presence of an 
Antagonist action with no occurrence of an Agonist action. The effect of a 
stationary persistence of the system in its original condition defines the 
prevention primitive of causality  (Figure C.9). 
 
Figure C.9 Prevention primitive of causality 
                                                
 
 
20 The fact that the Antagonist is overcome by the stronger Agonist action is represented in the coordinate 


















 The primitives of causality introduced so far were characterized by a static 
nature: the antagonist action was either present or absent, and no changes were allowed 
on the system. Next it is possible to consider cases where dynamic considerations come 
into play by means of external agents acting on the system configuration.  
 
• Fragilizing: Coordinates {0, -1}: this primitive originates from the removal of 
an Antagonist action with no occurrence of an Agonist action. The causal 
relationship between the cause “removed Antagonist action” and the effect 
“unblocked hazard escalation” with the system persisting in its original 
condition defines the fragilizing primitive of causality (Figure C.10).  
 
 
Figure C.10 Fragilizing primitive of causality 
 
• Letting: Coordinates {1, -1}: this primitive originates from the presence of an 
Agonist action and the removal of an Antagonist action. The causal relationship 
between the cause “Agonist presence and removal of Antagonist action” and the 












Figure C.11 Letting primitive of causality 
 The six primitives of causality identified so far can be summarized in the matrix 
form, as can be seen in Figure C.12. The {0, 0} coordinates indicate a “steady” 
condition, as this situation implies that neither Agonist nor Antagonist actions are 
present, and hence there are no dynamics occurring at the system level.  
 
Figure C.12 Primitives of causality – Agonist and Antagonist interactions 
 
Interactions between Agonist and Inverse Agonist Actions 
 The notion of Inverse Agonist is not present in Talmy’s work. As mentioned 
previously, this concept was borrowed and extended from the biochemistry framework. 
By definition of Inverse Agonist, this category of actions requires the occurrence of a 




























state. Primitives of causality in this case are thus restricted to the case of presence of the 
Agonist.  
 As in the previous case, the primitives of causality are summarized in a matrix 
form, this time considering Inverse Agonist actions on the y-axis.  
 Note that even if the Inverse Agonist differs both in nature and in effect on the 
hazard level from the Antagonist action, they share the primitives of “direct causation”, 
“despite” and “letting” given their defensive nature. However, the blocking primitive is 
now replaced by: 
• De-escalation: Coordinates {1, 1+}: this primitive originates from the presence 
of both an Agonist and an Inverse Agonist action on the system, with the 
Inverse Agonist action stronger than the Agonist force. The causal relationship 
between the cause “Agonist and Inverse Agonist action presence” and the effect 
“hazard de-escalation” is defined as de-escalation primitive of causality (Figure 
C.13). 
 
Figure C.13 De-escalation primitive of causality 
 The primitives of causality derived from the interactions between Agonist and 












Figure C.14 Primitives of causality – Agonist and Inverse Agonist interactions 
 
 The one-to-one interactions analyzed so far can be combined together to 
generate the complex web of causality that characterizes real accidents. The 
introduction of the primitives of causality allows a finer description of the micro-causal 
transitions between different states, as if each transition (or part of the accident 
sequence) was analyzed under a microscope. The plurality and co-existence of 
primitives of causality then shapes the accident sequence by contributing to its 





















OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES AND NOTES ON THE 
FRAMEWORK APPLICABILITY 
 
 The framework and analytical tools presented in this work leveraged the two 
ingredients of model-based hazard monitoring and of Temporal Logic. As noted in 
Chapter 5, other than for the specification and modeling of digital components (which 
is the prime use of TL in the software engineering community), TL was employed for 
the definition of more complex expressions of H(t), which included temporal ordering 
inside the analytical definition of the danger indices of interest. This use, as well as the 
specification of safety property to constraint the system behavior, can also be achieved 
by leveraging the state-space representation formalisms alone, at the expenses of more 
complex expressions for H(t) (for instance, involving derivatives with respect to time in 
place of the temporal operators), and of bigger state-space models, possibly facing the 
problem of state explosion.  
 The adoption of TL thus allowed to reduce the number of states to model in 
detail for the system of interest and allowed to re-introduce the dynamical behavior of 
specific states without recurring to additional state equations. Important questions arise 
then in relation to the previous considerations, such as: Which states are best modeled 
using the state-space representation? When should TL be considered within the 
definition of H(t) itself?  
 The answers to these important questions are, in a sense, case dependent, and 
rely on the experience and the ingenuity of the analyst of the system. Nevertheless, 
there are high-level guidelines that can be devised and can provide important 
suggestions whenever an external user wishes to implement (or adopt part of) the 
framework presented in this work.  
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 The process of adopting the proposed framework for the analysis of a novel 
system needs careful attention and research on the part of the user and can be 
summarized by looking at four important steps, which are described next.	  	  
 
1) Definition of the scope of the analysis and the accident of interest: The first 
step for the adoption of the proposed approach is the careful understanding of 
the scope of the analysis. For instance, the approach adopted in Chapter 5 was, 
in a sense, that of accident reconstruction for the purpose of investigating 
contributory causes, and of understanding potential flaws in the system design. 
Two main types of analysis can be devised: ex-post analysis (after the system 
has been designed and adverse events have occurred), and ex-ante analysis 
(before adverse events have unfolded, towards validation of the system design). 
In both cases there will be specific safety requirements that the system has to 
meet (for instance, dictated by regulations), or that the analyst wishes to verify 
to test his/her hypothesis of a potential failure. This in turn translates into the 
definition of the specific safety properties of interest to be used as constraints on 
the system behavior. Each constraint works towards the devising of a “safety 
envelope” or boundary of safe operations. At this stage, it is not necessary to 
express the constraint or the safety envelope in state-space or in Temporal 
Logic, and qualitative definitions are acceptable. In fact this first step is a high-
level drafting of the following step 3, which will account for the detailed 
modeling. This first step is mostly aimed at better understanding which 
conditions will define an accident, or, in other words, the conditions that define 
when the system is breaching the safety envelope of operations. The 
understanding of the conditions that define an accident (for instance, the “loss of 
containment through tower overflow” for the oil tank example of Chapter 3) are 
fundamental for choosing the state variables to pick for the system analysis and 
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for the definition of the hazard levels of interest (for instance, the choice of 
translating the accident “loss of containment” into the requirement of 
monitoring the height of oil inside the tower).  
 On a practical level, it is good to start by looking at regulatory 
constraints for the system, and at similar systems that have in the past 
experienced mishaps and adverse events, to better understand the accident(s) of 
interest. Moreover, any risk assessment approach starts with a “hazard 
identification” effort, aimed at exploring the potential problems of a system (for 
instance through HAZOP tools, as indicated in Chapter 2). This information can 
be a good starting point also for the application of the proposed framework.  
 
2) Development of the dynamical model: Once it is clear which accidents the user 
whishes to monitor/do prevention against, it is possible to start the actual 
modeling of the system under consideration. That is, based on the rough idea of 
the accident and constraint of interest, the user has to develop a dynamical 
model. The framework was in this work implemented in Simulink, as this 
environment provides multiple modeling tools to combine continuous and 
digital components. One of the most important choices is that of defining the 
level of detail necessary for the analysis, and understand for which parts of the 
system to develop the detailed state-space representation. Once more, this 
choice is dictated by the scope of the analysis of step 1, but it is also constrained 
by the information available on the system. For instance, it is intuitive that the 
modeling of digital components can occur in state-flow, with state charts and 
guarding functions to command the transitions between states more or less 
detailed depending on the information that is available to the user on the actual 
software codes. For continuous systems, which the user wishes to model with 
state-space, other considerations apply. For instance, a user could leverage 
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traditional tools of PRA such as fault trees (whenever they have been developed 
for the system of interest) to discover which functions/components contribute 
the most to the computation of the probability associated to a given failure 
event, and model in detail only those. In other cases the choice is informed 
and/or dictated by the accident of interest.  For instance, in the accident 
sequence of Chapter 5, a much more refined model that considered the lateral 
movement of the plane and the states associated to the various control surfaces 
could have been developed. However, for that specific case the NTSB report 
shows that there wasn’t a significant lateral movement of the aircraft, making a 
more refined model a huge expense in term of time, with little contribution for 
the analysis of interest. There is thus a cost-benefit analysis in relation to the 
difficulty of having more complex and detailed model and to the benefit that 
such refined models can bring to the analysis.  
 In general, it is a safe bet and good practice to start out with a simpler 
model that only takes into account a handful of states that are necessary for the 
monitoring of the accident(s) of interest defined in step 1. Only later, should 
more refined results be needed, modifications and additional information can be 
employed to refine the system model.  
 
3) Detailed definition of the TL constraints and of the hazard levels of interest: 
Once the model for the dynamical system has been developed, the user needs to 
devise and model the metrics of interest (in terms of danger indices or hazard 
levels) and express in a quantifiable way the constraints associated with the 
safety envelope for the system under consideration. Their qualitative definition 
is based on step 1, and their quantification requires a long process of trial-and-
error, to make sure that the metrics picked for the analysis can capture the 
behavior that the user originally intended. As mentions in the concluding 
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chapters, some constraints (such as the four ones considered for the case of 
Chapter 5) are easily adaptable to different system and can be considered as a 
starting point for the analysis. There is not a strict rule that tells whether it is 
more convenient to start with the definition of the danger indices, or the 
definition of the constraints. In general, they will inform each other, as not all 
metrics are relevant for the selected constraints and vice versa. There are thus 
multiple iterations that occur within this step. A first issue to discuss is the 
understanding of whether TL is necessary for the expression of both constraints 
and H(t) definitions. As a rule of thumb, whenever temporal ordering is an issue 
and the user whishes to analyze the effects of H(t) dynamics (e.g. hazard 
escalation, or de-escalation) at different times, TL is a good candidate. This is so 
because the use of state-space alone may result in too complex model, resulting 
in a poor balance of that cost-benefit trade-off previously mentioned. Regarding 
the actual formulation of the metrics of interest, ingenuity and a good 
knowledge of the system are necessary ingredients.  
 In general, it is a good practice to start by looking at possible thresholds 
for the states of interest (i.e., understand whether there is a minimum or a 
maximum associated with safe or nominal system operations). For instance, in 
the case of the oil tank example, a maximum height was easily identifiable; or in 
the case of an aircraft, there are bounds of acceptable values of the angle of 
attack to prevent stall, or on the maximum stresses to be withstood by the 
fuselage. Whenever conditions similar to the previous ones can be defined, 
hazard levels and metrics can be devised as ratios between the actual state of the 
system and the maximum acceptable value (and/or range). When simple bounds 
cannot be defined, the second option adopted in this work was the construction 
of ratios between two quantities that are state-dependent. This was the case of 
the metric analyzed in relation to RTO initiation, where both the stopping 
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distance (the numerator) and the available distance to stop (the denominator) 
depended on the states of the system. Finally, a third option adopted in this work 
was that of combining simple ratios (such as the normalized position along the 
runway) with logical variables (i.e., true - 1 or false - 0 evaluations) that 
represent whether specific conditions are met by the system. This was the case 
of the fail-safe analysis carried out in conjunction with the identification of 
spurious AIR mode indications. Future applications are likely to provide 
additional operational guidelines towards this step. 
 
4) Simulation of the system and post-processing analysis: With the development 
of the dynamical system and of the associated indices completed, the user can 
now run the simulation and analyze the results. These results are provided in 
terms of a report of violation/compliance with the specified constraints, and in 
terms of plots of H(t) in time. As indicated in Chapter 6, simple control panels 
were developed for the thesis, and there are interesting implications and 
research opportunities in terms of human factor and human-machine interfaces 
that can aide the development of more complex visual aides, especially in 
relation to their on-line use. This is an important capability of the proposed 
approach, given the not so intuitive and easily understood results that traditional 
DPRA tools provide to the user/analyst, as discussed in Chapter 2, 6, and 
Appendix B.  
 
 The process previously outlined is not necessarily carried out in a linear fashion. 
Some steps can inform the definition of other ones, and some iterations are needed in 
most cases to achieved a good level of detail (satisfactory for the specific goal the user 
intended for the analysis).  The considerations contained in the previous steps can 
furthermore be combined with some of the operational guidelines contained in 
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Figure D.4 Operational steps for the application of the proposed framework 
 The thesis provided a case study that served as “proof-of-concept” of the 
theoretical development carried out in chapters 1-4. It is hoped that its detailed 
development in chapter 5 together with the guidelines provided here can serve as an 
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